NGLS Roundup, no. 67, February 2001

 

 

SECOND PREPCOM FOR SMALL ARMS CONFERENCE MEETS

 

 

INTRODUCTION

The second session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects met from 8-19 January 2001 at UN headquarters in New York. The Conference itself will convene from 9-20 July 2001, also in New York, with the purpose of finding means to prevent, control and curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. How to accomplish such goals elicited divergent views from delegations during the PrepCom, however. Some governments sought to address the root causes of conflict, while others stressed the need to formulate measures in the context of the non-interference of the internal affairs of states and their right to self-defence. Many delegations felt that any approach to the current challenge should be shaped by the specific characteristics and security needs of individual countries and regions.

 

Chaired by Carlos Dos Santos (Mozambique), the PrepCom focused much of its energy on framing and strengthening the elements of the final documents that will guide the work of the Conference, including the Chair's proposed draft Programme of Action (A/CONF.192/PC/L.4) and a possible political declaration. The Chair was to prepare an updated version of the draft Programme of Action, which was to be made available four weeks prior to the third session of the PrepCom in New York from 19-30 March. The PrepCom adopted its final report (A/CONF.192/PC/L.6), which includes a decision to approve draft rule 33 of the Conference rules of procedure, stating that every effort to reach consensus should be exhausted at the July Conference before matters of substance are put to a vote. The PrepCom also approved a draft agenda for the Conference, which would have it conduct a general exchange of views and adopt final documents containing a series of measures aimed at collective action to eradicate the illicit small arms trade.

Several important decisions were deferred to the third session of the PrepCom, including consideration of the final documents, the draft rules of procedure and the draft objective of the Conference, and modalities of attendance by non-governmental organizations.

 

During the second session UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Joao Honwana (Mozambique), Chief of the Conventional Arms Branch of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, as Secretary-General of the Conference, and Mohammad Sattar (Afghanistan), Senior Political Affairs Officer of the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services, as Deputy Secretary-General.

 

 

CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT AND MAJOR AREAS OF DEBATE

The PrepCom undertook a sequential consideration of the Chair's draft action programme in a week-long plenary review. Committee members stressed their determination to end the human suffering caused by the illicit small arms trade while remaining within the mandate of the Conference. Delegations also reaffirmed the need to preserve the sovereignty of states as prescribed by the Charter. The draft text contained four sections: a 30-paragraph preamble; a section on preventing, controlling and curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, which contains concrete measures at the national, regional and global levels; a section on international cooperation and assistance; and on implementation and follow-up.

 

Preamble Versus Political Declaration

Consideration of the preamble drew sharp debate, as delegates considered whether or not to formulate a separate political declaration or include all references to political commitments in the lengthy preambular section. The preamble contains 30 paragraphs and begins by expressing a determination to end the human suffering caused by the illicit trade and subsequent misuse of small arms and light weapons which kill, maim, and terrorize thousands of innocent people. If adopted, countries would commit themselves to launching and implementing an integrated action plan at the national regional and global levels to prevent, reduce and curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

 

While delegations expressed flexibility, they sought to ensure that any final documents would contain strong language on the political commitments underpinning the goal of the Conference to eradicate the illicit small arms trade. The United States, South Africa, Canada and the European Union (EU) agreed that one comprehensive document that was both practical and political would best serve the Conference. The EU proposed that the PrepCom concentrate on making progress on the Action Plan and preamble, rather than attempting to draft two sets of final documents. The EU felt that the outcome of the Conference should be politically binding and that the action plan should be underpinned by the principles contained in the preamble. Jordan, on behalf of the League of Arab states, said that if consensus was reached on the issue any political statement should affirm that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons was not the root cause of conflict but exacerbated it. Malaysia agreed, saying that the preamble should acknowledge that small arms and light weapons had significantly prolonged and intensified post-cold war regional conflicts and that long after conflicts had formally ended, stockpiles of small arms continued to threaten public order, often hampering post-conflict nation-building efforts.

 

While some delegations emphasized the need to simplify the language of many of the preamble's paragraphs, others sought to preserve the nature of some specific references, particularly those highlighting the importance of regional efforts and adherence to the principles of the UN Charter. Libya said that the preamble should stress the need to solve conflicts by peaceful means within the rules of international law and with respect for the Charter, but that the right of states to protect themselves and to develop their own defence systems must be insured. It also felt that the negative aspects of globalization, which “affected the complexity of the situation,” should also be addressed in the preamble.

 

Preventing, Controlling and Curbing the Illicit Small Arms Trade

The second section on preventing, controlling and curbing the illicit small arms trade calls for measures regarding the illicit manufacture, acquisition, stockpile and transfer of those weapons, as well as measures to prevent diversion from legal manufacture, acquisition and transfer. It also contains measures on: stockpile management and safe storage; the collection and destruction of illicit and surplus small arms and light weapons; civilian possession of those weapons; post-conflict situations and effective disarmament in the context of peacekeeping operations; and transparency, confidence-building and exchange of information.

 

There was concern among some delegations that many of the recommendations in this section were far-reaching and overly ambitious. Others including Canada insisted that “we should not fear ambition.” It argued that a narrow approach was insufficient and that it was necessary to “reach farther than ever” to achieve new points of consensus in order to address the serious problem of trade in illicit small arms. Canada and others felt it was critical to tackle the problem from a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration perspective. Lesotho agreed, saying that given the magnitude of the problem “perhaps ambition is exactly what is needed.” Nepal called for a comprehensive approach, saying that it was imperative to bear in mind the need to reduce the demand for small arms and light weapons. It called on governments to consider the causes that engendered conflict such as poverty, underdevelopment and insecurity. Once those issues were properly addressed and conflicts were resolved, Nepal said, the illicit arms trade would be significantly reduced.

 

The United States felt that governments were ultimately responsible for solving the problem of illicit trade and argued against “straying from the mandate” of the Conference. It said including provisions on child soldiers, legal trade, civilian possession and redefining rules of armed conflict would only “complicate efforts and endanger any chance of success.” The US also noted that the core language in the section appeared to create a “legal obligation” for states. The US felt the object of the Conference should be to create political commitments, not draft a treaty. Mali introduced the Bamako Declaration, adopted by the December 2000 Ministerial Conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in order to help guide the PrepCom's deliberations. The basic structure of the Bamako Declaration, according to some delegations, could provide the PrepCom with a blueprint to soften the mandatory tone of some of the language included in the second section.

 

Transparency

The issue of transparency and its impact on national security was hotly debated. China cautioned that the issue of transparency in the manufacture of small arms involved national security and could therefore be divisive for the Conference. China called for an exchange of views by governments on their respective legislative schemes on the manufacture of small arms. The US felt that transparency in matters of small arms transfer was important and emphasized the need for enhanced law enforcement, custom services and border controls as well as appropriate bilateral, regional and international information exchanges. However it said transparency should not extend to national holdings.

 

With respect to the transparency of arms deliveries, the Russian Federation warned that such transfers were difficult to control and monitor, and it emphasized that transparency efforts should seek to “unmask” illicit transfers only. Russia felt that it was more important to concentrate on concrete measures aimed at freeing regions of conflict from illicit arms flows, rather than radical measures to reduce and monitor legal transfers and deliveries of such weapons. It said remedial efforts undertaken globally as well as by the UN had been insufficient, and it cited the illicit circulation of small arms in Kosovo.

 

Licit Versus Illicit Trade

The transparency debate led to questions about licit versus illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons, as many NGOs and a number of governments pointed out that all illicit arms start out as legal. Norway noted that half of the world's small arms were in civilian possession, which meant that “a good portion of those were outside the control [or] knowledge of the authorities and, therefore, invariably subject to become part of the illicit arms trade.”

 

Speaking on behalf of the EU, Sweden agreed that almost all small arms originated from legal sources but noted that “the problem started further down the chain,” where weapons were diverted through less scrupulous trading including theft. There was a fine line between legal and illegal transfers, Sweden said, and the number of small arms getting into the illegal circuit could only be restricted by taking strong measures to keep them in legal hands. Mexico felt that the weakest links in the legal transfer of weapons among states should be considered, and noted that many comments during the general PrepCom debate had focused on states that did not have adequate national legislation or effective measures of cooperation at the regional level. There was a shortcoming in the draft, Mexico said, since it did not focus on the responsibility of exporters and manufacturers or brokers who carried out the financial transactions.

 

Sri Lanka said that the legitimate procurement of small arms for the purpose of national security should not be the focus. Along with India it felt that the PrepCom should focus on links the illegal trade in arms had to other transboundary crimes such as trafficking in women and drugs. India proposed a comprehensive approach that included an in-depth analysis of the ammunition trade as one part of gun smuggling.

 

Peru agreed that the international community must ensure that legal weapons were not diverted for illicit activities, and it highlighted the issue of supply. Peru also suggested that pre-marking weapons or strengthening the responsibility of manufacturers would help curb the flow of illegal arms. Lesotho agreed, emphasizing that the development and implementation of national programmes to manage the illicit arms flows required the proper marking of licit weapons, as that would enable traceability once those weapons became illicit.

 

Tracking the Illicit Trade

Many delegations highlighted the necessity of establishing adequate procedures for marking and tracking illegal small arms and proposed that a comprehensive mechanism for tracking small arms could form the nexus of UN efforts to implement international arms embargoes. Some delegations also suggested that the PrepCom consider fashioning a legally binding instrument on the issue while others went further and called for an international convention.

 

Pakistan insisted that small arms could be effectively traced and noted that it would illogical to assume that states transferred weapons without any records. If only for the financial benefit of the manufacturers, weapons would be marked and therefore it would be possible to trace them. Pakistan proposed that a proper marking system for numbering weapons be included in the official recommendations of the Conference. It was unhelpful to guard such transactions in the private and financial sectors, Pakistan said; and governments must retain control. However the Russian Federation urged caution and noted that establishing tracking mechanisms that were “camouflaged” to monitor the legal transfer of weapons went beyond the Conference's mandate. Colombia drew attention to what it described as an emerging problem: the issue of small arms designed to look like toys or other everyday items, which made them easier to conceal.

 

International Cooperation and Assistance

The third section of the draft Programme of Action, on international cooperation and assistance, contains provisional agreements by countries in the areas of police, intelligence, customs and border control, civil society, and research and awareness raising. Delegations felt that the text provided a good basis on which to proceed, but that the section needed to be strengthened to expand cooperation beyond facilitation to include assistance. Many countries proposed incorporating recommendations of the Bamako Declaration on questions such as: cooperation at all levels; types of activities NGOs might undertake; financial backing; ending the dumping of surplus weapons; legislative/regulatory measures; the role of international organizations; strengthening of the World Customs Union and Interpol; and helping states to fight terrorism and arms trafficking.

 

Nigeria urged the PrepCom to take special account of the views of countries most affected by small arms proliferation and illicit trafficking. It said it was time for the PrepCom to go beyond mere recognition of national and regional initiatives, and craft a global action plan that would facilitate implementation of those initiatives through technical and financial assistance. Nigeria noted that weapons collection and destruction was a very expensive venture, and assistance was needed for post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and for the formulation and implementation of initiatives aimed at reducing the demand for small arms. Indeed, Nigeria said, assistance and cooperation were a means to enhance law enforcement capabilities, information exchange and capacity building in ways that could “change the culture of violence so deeply rooted in many regions of the world.”

 

China expressed reservations about text on the need for global norms and principles; it felt these should be national or regional in general. Jamaica, noting that island states face unique challenges in border controls, emphasized that different regions and countries have specific needs and that cooperation and assistance programmes must take full account of this.

 

The US, addressing assistance and cooperation, gave examples of where it was already providing substantial assistance to countries' efforts to control and reduce small arms and light weapons. Like China, however, the US was concerned that language be consistent with the political--rather than legally binding--nature of the document.

 

Sweden, on behalf of the EU, agreed that there was a need for stronger language on international assistance, including: support for capacity building; weapons collection, disarmament and destruction; enhancing cooperation of all parts of the UN system; strengthening the regulation of private security actors; security sector reform; the development role of regional and sub-regional actors; and the importance of mobilizing civil society and promoting “cultures of peace.” Cuba felt that assistance and cooperation efforts should address deeper causes that perpetuate the illicit trade in small arms such as conflicts, terrorism and drug trafficking.

 

Canada said that control of small arms and light weapons was in many respects a development issue, and “development actors” including NGOs should therefore play a key role. Japan said that an enhanced role for development institutions in support of weapons collection, safeguarding and disposal, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should include Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) assistance agencies, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and regional development banks.

 

China and Egypt both expressed concern that states and NGOs appeared to be on an equal footing in the draft Programme of Action and said that states had the primary role in negotiations. Norway disagreed and said that NGOs should be given a more prominent role in the Programme of Action with regard to awareness, advocacy, action research and disarmament and rehabilitation projects.

 

Implementation and Follow-Up

The fourth section on implementation and follow-up submits examples of immediate follow-up actions to be taken at the national, regional and global levels. Many delegations suggested that any approach should integrate four functions: implementation, coordination, review and evaluation.

 

A proposal to hold a review conference in 2005 was not adopted. Algeria noted that setting up such a mechanism at this time might have the negative effect of burdening some countries. On the other hand, it said that a financing mechanism should be set up promptly to enable states to devise national plans to combat the small arms phenomenon. India agreed that an overall follow-up mechanism should flow from agreements reached at the Conference. Colombia however, said that it was essential to provide “ongoing follow-up” to the July event, including conferences on a regular basis to assess implementation of the action plan and immediate follow-up actions at the national level. States should be urged to set up national coordinating bodies within relevant infrastructures to monitor the proliferation, control, circulation, trade, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons, Colombia said.

 

Ghana highlighted the importance of the Bamako Declaration and said that any immediate follow-up action should be aimed at building on initiatives already underway and monitoring implementation of the outcome of the Conference at the regional, national and local levels. Ghana also urged the PrepCom to give particular consideration to mechanisms aimed at developing legal and technical initiatives to stem the flow of illegal arms at the regional level.

 

Canada said that the follow-up process to the Conference should fully reflect the multi-faceted nature of the small arms problem and engage the broad spectrum of national, regional and global actors. A follow-up process or body involving all interested parties could be established to ensure that its work was carried forward on a collective and comprehensive basis, it said. South Africa also sought a structured follow-up procedure and said the Conference, which was the beginning of a process and not a resolution, should encourage states as well as regional and subregional groups to implement the action plan in a timely and comprehensive manner.

 

 

PREPCOM HEARS NGO PERSPECTIVES

On 18 January the PrepCom held an informal meeting to listen to the views of NGOs. Representatives from 31 organizations, many of which are part of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), made presentations in five thematic clusters.

 

Reduction and Control of Illicit Trade

in Small Arms and Light Weapons

Michael Crowley of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) addressed the issue of enforcement of UN and regional arms embargoes. He urged that the Conference reinforce existing obligations to bring to justice those responsible for “embargo busting” and to strengthen and expand existing embargo regimes. Loretta Bondi of Fund for Peace USA highlighted the need to control arms brokers and pointed to the lack of regulation that had resulted in these operators acting with impunity in areas of conflict. She exhorted countries to make better use of existing international agreements such as extradition treaties and mutual legal cooperation agreements, and echoed the Chair's call for an internationally binding agreement on arms brokers.

 

Antonio Bendeira of Viva Rio addressed the issue of illegal firearms trafficking in Brazil, which he said is linked to dealers operating in Paraguay. He urged the PrepCom to take aggressive measures to counter illicit arms trafficking and brokering across national borders. Brian Wood of Amnesty International questioned language in the draft Programme of Action on the “misuse” of small arms. Referring to precedents in international law, he said that no government should authorize the transfer of small arms where there is a clear risk that they will be used by the recipient to commit serious human rights abuses, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Mr. Wood also called for tougher controls on arms brokers and regulation of their use of tax havens.

 

Enhancing Legal Controls

Greg Puley, of the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress of Costa Rica and SAFER NET of Canada, emphasized the links between domestic regulation and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. He called on the PrepCom to promote and support initiatives aimed at strengthening and harmonizing regulation of civilian possession of small arms to reduce the risk of theft, illicit trafficking and misuse. He suggested that the Conference implement an international norm of non-possession of military specification assault weapons and ensure that detailed, accurate and accessible records be maintained of all small arms sales and resales.

 

Paul Eavis of Saferworld noted that failure to exert effective control over the legal small arms trade had increased the diversion to illicit markets and end-users, and had blurred the line between the legal and illicit trade. He urged the PrepCom to agree to a comprehensive set of international norms and standards to govern the legal trade. Ilhan Berkol of the Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Securite (GRIP) of Belgium spoke about developing international systems of weapons marking and tracing and proposed that national, regional and international registers be established to record the manufacture and sale of small arms and light weapons. He also proposed the creation of a UN agency to centralize these registers and facilitate verification, control and information exchange.

 

Collection, Security and Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Sarah Meek of International Alert in the United Kingdom spoke of the importance of stockpile security and reducing surplus stocks to combat the excessive availability and flows of small arms and light weapons. She noted that armed forces, police and other state bodies are key targets for criminals and armed groups. She urged the PrepCom to include measures to establish effective systems for managing and accounting for weapons stocks, establishing high standards for the security of such stocks, and ensuring that all weapons losses are reported and investigated. 

 

Peter Davies of Oxfam International reported on the impact of the proliferation of arms in 27 countries where Oxfam has field workers. He called on the Conference to work toward an international marking and tracing regime, a convention with “teeth” to regulate brokering and shipping agents, better management of legitimate stocks of weapons, and a commitment of international funds to work with civil society to “mop up” excessive numbers of small arms. “Creative programmes of civil society to stem proliferation cannot be effective,” Mr. Davies said, “unless there is a political commitment of governments to establish Codes of Conduct, norms, standards and an effective plan of action.”

 

Mayda de León of the Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES) gave an overview of small arms problems in Guatemala and stressed the importance of collecting the weapons that are currently in illegal circulation and the “intimate relationship between control, collection and legality.” She underlined the role of civil society in the formulation and implementation of government plans and the need for concerted action between governments and civil society.

 

Information Exchange, Transparency and Accountability

Peter Bachelor of the Small Arms Survey of Switzerland stressed that lack of transparency in the legal trade had maximized opportunities for the diversion of small arms from the legal trade to the illicit circuits and had made it difficult to distinguish legal from illicit transfers. Joost Hilterman of Human Rights Watch USA underlined the way in which “today's armed conflicts” are marked by the active targeting of civilians as an integral component of fighting. He emphasized that “those who actively supply weapons to forces they know are committing gross violations of the laws of war, including war crimes, must be held accountable as accessories to these crimes if the notion of an international rule of law is to have any force.”

 

Demand Issues

Liviu Muresan of the European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management (EURISC Foundation) in Romania spoke of the nexus of trafficking in small arms, organized crime and corruption. He urged the PrepCom to improve cooperation at all levels and stressed the role of civil society. He cited the framework of the Pact of Stability in southeast Europe as an excellent example of government-NGO cooperation in combating organized crime. 

 

Robert Phiri of the Public Affairs Committee of Malawi reported on the effectiveness of public awareness programmes, which he said had prevented and reduced demand for small arms. He noted that the key principle in such initiatives was the involvement of civil society in the production of civic awareness materials.

 

David Jackman of the Quaker United Nations Office in the US said that successful programmes in lessening demand for small arms tended to be forms of broader community development, rather than specialized criminal justice or arms control work. He noted that the most successful programmes were directed by the community residents themselves, with a focus on tackling the conditions that feed the “gun culture:” poverty, unemployment, youth alienation and involvement with drugs. He stressed the potential of ex-combatants to become powerful peace promoters and pointed to what was described as positive experiences in this regard in Mozambique, Nicaragua and Northern Ireland.

 

Friar Carroll Houle, on behalf of Pax Christi International and other religious groups, underlined the importance of religious communities in brokering conflict resolution arrangements and noted their role in the creation of a culture of peace.

 

Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister of France and on behalf of the Co-Chairs of the Eminent Persons Group, called control of the licit trade “critical” to eradicating illicit traffic. “Half of licitly-traded small arms and light weapons end up supplying illicit traffic due to lack of state regulation and transparency,” he said. He affirmed the Secretary-General's report on illicit traffic in small arms (A/55/323), which says that small weapons “must be brought under the control of the state, with the state being made accountable for their transfer.” Mr. Rocard emphasized the group's view that efforts to restrict the scope of the Conference to illicit transfers were merely attempts to avoid state responsibility.

 

CONTACTS

 

Conventional Arms Branch

Department for Disarmament Affairs

Room S-3170I

United Nations

New York 10017, United States

telephone +1-212/963 3768

fax +1-212/963 1121

e-mail <mcnab@un.org>

website (www.un.org/Depts/dda/cab/index.html)

 

International Network on Small Arms (IANSA)

Box 422

London WC1E 7BS, United Kingdom

e-mail <contact@iansa.org>

website (www.iansa.org)

 

Conference documents including speeches, conference room papers and draft texts are available through the Small Arms Survey database, which can be found at website (www.smallarmssurvey.org).

 

 

This edition of NGLS Roundup was prepared by the United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS). The NGLS Roundup is produced for NGOs and others interested in the institutions, policies and activities of the UN system and is not an official record.