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Nutrition Information in Crisis Situations -
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
NICS 9, May 2006
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), with an estimated 23
million inhabitants in a territory of 120,540 km2, shares borders with South
Korea, China and Russia (see map). DPRK has a centralised socialist economic
system. Often referred to as a uniquely closed political system, the state
exerts pervasive control over the population, the economy, and information
(Becker, 1998; UNCHR, 2004; Eberstadt, 10/04). Following floods in 1995, DPRK
requested humanitarian aid for the first time in its history and foreigners were
allowed into the country (Becker, 1998). Ten years later, the government of DPRK
declared the emergency over (AFP, 16/03/05; Concern, 20/09/05; Reuters,
10/10/05) and asked the UN agencies and NGOs working in the country to terminate
their emergency programmes by the end of 2005 (Concern, 20/09/05; DPA,
22/09/05). The aim of this article is to review the trends in the nutrition
situation and underlying factors such as food security over this decade and try
to ascertain if the emergency is over, recognising that in the "Hermit Kingdom",
the paucity of reliable information creates many challenges (Becker, 1998; ICG,
25/04/05; Noland, 07/03).
Background
Prior to being divided into two at the end of the Second World War, the
northern part of the Korean peninsula was mostly industrialised, and the south
was the bread basket which produced most of the food (USCHRNK, 2005). After the
war, North Korea pursued a policy of food self-sufficiency (USCHRNK, 2005), but
with only about 20% of arable land, and an adverse climate, significant yields
could only be achieved by intensive farming, highly dependent on external inputs
such as fertilisers and pesticides. Intensive farming together with increased
deforestation eventually resulted in soil depletion and erosion. Areas under
cultivation have been mostly concentrated in the south of DPRK, with South and
North Phyongan and South and North Hwangae representing 60% of the cultivated
areas (FAO/WFP, 25/11/1997).
It seems that North Korea did well in terms of economic development after the
Korean war up to the 1970s, with remarkable economic growth, and rapidly
improving living standards (ICG, 25/04/05). The harvest doubled from 3.5 m MT in
1966, to 7.7 m MT in 1984, as a result of expansion of land under cultivation,
mechanisation, irrigation, and heavy use of fertilisers (ICG, 25/04/05; Woo-Cumings,
2002). Requisite inputs for agriculture, and shortfalls in cereal production,
were mostly covered through the preferential system of trade with the USSR,
which also provided most of North Korea's needs for coal and refined oil, and
one third of its steel (Noland, 07/03).
North Korea's economy, farming, and people's entitlement to food, goods, and
basic needs were centrally controlled by the state. Cereals were to be
dispatched to the population by the Public Distribution System (PDS) at
subsidised prices, after the collective farms had kept their part. This ensured
the redistribution of cereals from surplus to deficit areas (Woo-Cumings, 2002).
Entitlements seemed to be a function of worker categories and political status.
North Korean society is apparently organised based on a classification of people
within three broad strata, and 51 categories, which depends on their perceived
loyalty to the party (FIDH, 11/03). The lower perceived "hostile" class is
thought to represent about 27% of the population, while the "basic mass" (middle
class) could represent 45%, and the "core mass" or upper class (staff of the
party, government and army) 28%. This classification, although denied by the
government of DPRK, seems to be confirmed by North Korean refugees and to serve
as a basis for entitlement to basic needs such as food, housing, health care,
and education. Occupation seems also to be allocated according to these
categories, with the perceived less reliable people being employed in dangerous
work and hard labour, and the upper class being recruited as staff for the
party, government, and army. Families from the lower class seem mostly located
in the inland regions (Seong-Ho, 03/03).
Onset of the crisis
The economic crisis and the related food shortages are thought to have begun
in the late 1980s (Becker, 1998; Eberstadt, 10/04) and intensified with the
collapse of the former USSR in the early 1990s that ended aid and subsidised
trade with North Korea (Eberstadt, 10/04). At the same time, China, the other
major trade partner, began demanding hard currency settlement for oil imports (ICG,
25/04/05). By 1993, imports from Russia were only 10% of their 1987-90 average
(Noland, 07/03). Energy supply dropped from 24 m MT in 1990 to 14 m MT in 1998 (ICG,
25/04/05), which paralysed the industry, transport, and agricultural sectors.
Moreover, the policy of the North Korean government which contracted debts in
the 1970s towards Western countries, the former USSR, and China, without
repaying them, discouraged these countries from providing further loans (Becker,
1998) and North Korea failed to establish new trade relationships. This economic
crisis was compounded by heavy floods in 1995 and 1996 which damaged crops and
the infrastructure for production of power (Woo-Cumings, 2002). Drought and
tidal waves in 1997 further worsened the situation (Katona-Apte, 1998). While it
is difficult to determine exactly when the crisis began, it seems likely that it
was well before 1995 when humanitarian aid was first requested.
Impact of the crisis
The impact of these combined problems of debt, lack of external raw materials
and energy imports together with natural disasters of flooding in 1995 and 96
followed by drought the next year provoked an enormous crisis in 1995/7. It is
thought that as many as 70% of factories, mines, schools, hospitals, and other
institutions had stopped functioning by 1997 (Becker, 1998).
Sharp decline in agricultural production
According to various estimates, there was a decline in agricultural
production in the 1990s compared to the 1980s (Noland, 07/03), and the
government failed to take action to guarantee adequate food supplies (USCHRNK,
2005). The sharp decline of fertilizer production, as a result of economic
collapse, has been thought to be the main contributor to reduced crop yield
(Woo-Cumings, 2002). The use of fertiliser dropped from 650,000 nutrient tonnes
in 1989 to 100,000 in 1996 (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04). In 1998, it was estimated that
only 20% of the tractors were operational, due to fuel and spare part shortages
(FAO/WFP, 25/06/98). Floods and drought seem to have resulted in the loss of
about 1.5 m MT of grains in 1995 and 1.6 to 1.9 million in 1997 (Katona-Apte,
1998), and livestock also seems to have decreased markedly (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04).
Public heath
The ability of the government to supply medicine and maintain the medical
infrastructure seems also to have collapsed with the economic crisis (UNICEF,
12/99). Testimonies seem to confirm the collapse of the health structures which,
at best, provided a diagnosis but no medication (GF, 03/04). Incidence of
diarrhoea and acute respiratory infection seemed to have risen as well as cases
of tuberculosis (UNICEF, 12/99). The quantity and the quality of water seemed to
have decreased (UNICEF, 12/99).
Public food Distribution System
The rations provided through the PDS seem to have been cut as early as the
late 1980s, and again in the early 1990s, when a campaign on "let's eat two
meals a day" was launched (AT, 15/01/05; USCHRNK, 2005). The PDS seems to have
virtually collapsed between 1994 and 1996, with the vestiges of its
functionality depending on the regions and population categories (AT, 15/01/05;
GF, 03/04; Seong- Ho, 03/2003; USCHRNK, 2005). The north-eastern areas (North
and South Hamgyong, Yanggang and Kangwon provinces) are thought to have been
affected two years earlier than other provinces (Noland, 07/03; Woo-Cumings,
2002), maybe partly because of the collapse of the transportation system (USCHRNK,
2005). Those areas were traditionally the poorest, and were food-deficit areas
due to inhospitable growing conditions and high urbanisation (USCHRNK, 2005).
According to a study, derived from testimonies of refugees mostly coming from
North and South Hamgyong, government rations (including PDS, farmers and
military rations) provided on average about 260 g/pers/day in 1994, and
represented the main source of food for 60% of the families (Robinson, 1999).
The rations however constantly declined afterwards and were only 42 g/pers/day
in 1996 and 24 g/pers/day in 1997. They only represented the main source of food
for 28.4%, 9.8%, and 5.7% of the families in 1995, 1996 and 1997, respectively.
In 1996, the provision of food seems to have been decentralised to the county
level, and distributions probably varied a lot depending on the county (Natsios,
08/99). The PDS is thought to have remained functional, mostly in the major
cities, for high-ranking party members, officers, and soldiers (Becker, 1998;
Noland, 07/03; Seong-Ho, 03/03), although the rations were cut by half (AT,
15/01/05). The military seemed also to have suffered from lack of food, and to
have engaged in violence against civilians to get food (Becker, 1998; GF,
03/04). People categorised in the "hostile" strata seemed the most affected, and
when the food distribution was limited, no food at all was provided to them (GF,
03/04).
Coping mechanisms
The population developed a number of coping mechanisms, which, at the peak of
the crisis, were however often insufficient to prevent starvation and deaths.
According to Robinson's study among refugees, as the PDS ration decreased,
people's main sources of food became purchase - for about 25% of the families in
1995,1996, and 1997 (it was 16% in 1994); barter - for about 15% of the families
(vs. 4% in 1994); and self-grown for about 7% (Robinson, 1999). Foraging for
wild greens, bark of trees, and roots increased the most significantly, from
11.9% in 1994 to 22.8%, 34.7%, and 40.2% in 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively.
According to these figures it seems that purchase, barter, and self-grown were
stretched to their limits, as they didn't increase while government rations
decreased, and then people seemed to have been more and more reliant on
foraging. The consumption of unusual wild foods is thought to have led to a high
number of deaths (Becker, 1998; GF, 03/04). The same pattern is observed from
other testimonies stating that from 1995, as the PDS ration decreased, people
began to sell their assets for food, but that by mid-1996, as no assets
remained, it was harder and harder to get food (Seong-Ho, 03/03). People also
seemed to rely on exchanging whatever could be stripped from places of
employment for food diverted from cooperative or hidden plots (USCHRNK, 2005).
Secret pre-harvesting seemed also to have been widespread (Natsios, 08/99), and
unauthorised markets seemed to have proliferated in both towns and the
countryside during the famine (Becker, 1998).
Most of the coping mechanisms which were developed for survival were not
authorised by the government, which seemed to have reinforced punishments for
trade and stealing of food (Becker, 1998). The lower stratum of the society
seemed more at risk when caught, and more vulnerable to thieves (GF, 03/04). At
the end of 1998, control of the population and population movement was
reinforced (Natsios, 08/99).
The famine
At the peak of the crisis, probably somewhere between mid-1995 and mid-1997 (GF,
03/04; Natsios, 08/99), a famine certainly occurred, although it has not been
witnessed by foreigners (who were prevented from accessing a number of areas)
and its extent is difficult to determine (Becker, 1998).
Mortality rates seemed to have increased between 1996 and 1997, whilst the
birth rate significantly declined within the same period (GF, 03/04). The same
pattern is reported in another study conducted through interviews with refugees,
who mostly came from the north-eastern province of North and South Hamgyong
(Robinson, 1999). The birth rate was halved between 1996 and 1997, and crude
death rate increased from 28.9/1,000 in 1995, to 45.6/1,000 and 56.0/1,000 in
1996 and 1997, respectively, that was far higher than the 5.5/1,000 derived from
the 1993 census. According to the government, there were 220,000 deaths from
starvation and related diseases between 1995 and 1998 (FIDH, 11/03; USCHRNK,
2005). Several studies attempted to quantify the number of deaths, relying on
testimonies from refugees or extrapolation from demographic data; and estimates
ranged between 600,000 and 3.5 m deaths, with one million, or about 5% of the
total population, being regarded as a reasonable estimate (GF, 03/04; Goodkind,
2001). Mortality of children less than nine years old, and of the elderly more
than 60 years old, seemed especially high (GF, 03/04). Widespread hunger oedema,
and a typhus epidemic, were also reported (Becker, 1998).
It is not clear if the famine hit mostly urban or rural areas. It might have
depended on the regions. Although there are some reports that people in rural
areas had better coping mechanisms, as some were able to cultivate small plots (USCHRNK,
2005), testimonies from the northern area revealed that peasants were not
better-off because of bad harvests and the required quota still being collected
by the government (MSF, 02/05/02). It also seems that cities offered more coping
mechanisms through widespread black markets. By the mid 1990s, conditions seemed
to be very different according to geographical regions and social groups
(Noland, 07/03). Pyongyang seemed to have been relatively protected, but still
also to have experienced shortages (USCHRNK, 2005).
Humanitarian assistance
DPRK requested humanitarian aid in 1995, leading to a widespread response
from countries, UN agencies, and NGOs. Food aid was about 500,000 MT in 1995 and
1996, rising to about 1 m MT, or about 15% to 20% of total minimum food needs,
between 1997 and 2000 (INTERFAIS). WFP has mostly targeted aid to children, the
elderly, and pregnant and nursing women, and has distributed fortified foods
(WFP, 23/07/04). There has also been humanitarian aid in other sectors such as
support to health infra-structure, agriculture, and water and sanitation.
The provision of humanitarian assistance has been highly controversial as the
reclusive policies of the government render the monitoring of humanitarian aid
very difficult (USCHRNK, 2005). Food was only authorised for channelling through
the government distribution system. Only a few expatriates (who must not be able
to speak Korean) were allowed into DPRK, and their movements were restricted.
Monitoring visits had to be requested in advance and were sometimes refused.
Expatriates were allocated official counterparts who accompanied them during
their field visits but often had no specific technical or sectoral skills (USCHRNK,
2005). Except in Pyongyang, the capital, expatriates were generally not allowed
to move freely out of their official compound. However, it seems that WFP
expatriates were authorised to do so in the recent years (USCHRNK, 2005). Forty
to 50 counties, representing about 16% of the population, have always remained
out bounds for humanitarian workers (FAO/WFP, 22/11/2004).
Some NGOs pulled out of the country after a few years of operation, because
of the difficulties in monitoring aid, arguing that humanitarian assistance was
not reaching the most needy (MSF, 02/05/02). Other humanitarian agencies have
continued their programmes. It has been argued that some of the humanitarian aid
was diverted to the military (USCHRNK, 2005), or was sold on the markets (Natsios,
08/99). It has also been stated that, at least in the mid-nineties, the
government concentrated external aid to some areas, and denied it to the
northern provinces of North and South Hamyong and Ryangang, representing 5.4
million people (Becker, 1998; USCHRNK, 2005). It has also been claimed that when
food aid began to arrive the government cut commercial imports of food, and
relocated the funds to other priorities, such as military, even during the
famine (USCHRNK, 2005).
Post crisis recovery
The situation appeared to have somewhat improved since 1999 (Eberstadt,
10/04). Although, some degree of recovery has been reported, it does not seem
that agriculture and industry have markedly recovered (ICG, 25/04/05). The
energy crisis also seems to have persisted (ICG, 25/04/05). The reported level
of imports dropped sharply between 1990 and 1998 after which it increased again
and by 2003 was twice the value of 1998. Exports were also known to have shown a
sharp drop since 1990 and have only recovered somewhat since 1998, although to a
much lower extent than imports. The trade deficit has therefore increased, and
this is thought to have been financed by contributions from governments such as
the US, China, South Korea, and Europe, in a mood of "engagement policy", and by
illicit trade (Eberstadt, 10/04). Between 1999 and 2003, it is estimated that
annual GDP growth was about 1 to 2% (ICG, 25/04/05), while it was -6.3 in 1997,
and -1.1 in 1998 (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04).
Agriculture production
In 2003 and 2004, the amount of fertiliser used had doubled compared to 1996,
mainly due to donations, and was slightly more than 200,000 nutrient tonnes,
although still far lower than the 600,000 thought to be used in 1989 (FAO/WFP,
22/11/04). 55% of the tractors seem to have been operational since 2001,
compared to 20% in 1998 (FAO/WFP, 26/10/01; FAO/WFP, 22/11/04), and the supply
of power had also improved in farms (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04). Although agricultural
production has stabilised since the mid-nineties, it has never returned to the
quantities produced in the 1980, and is thought to have been below 4 m MT until
2002 (Noland, 07/03). In 2003/2004, the estimate of cereal-equivalent production
was about 4.3 m MT (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04), and was again 4% higher in 2005 than in
2004 (USDA, 18/11/05). Livestock also seems to have recovered somewhat, with an
increase especially in the number of goats and rabbits (by 260% and 540%,
between 1996 and 2001, respectively) which the government had encouraged the
rearing of as well as poultry (FAO/WFP, 26/10/01).
Economic reforms in 2002
Economic reforms, such as the increase in official prices and wages, and
market reforms were announced in July 2002 (ICG, 25/04/05). Food, fuel, and
electricity prices increased by 26 times on average, and rice increased by 550
times (ICG, 25/04/05); while wages only rose by an average factor of 18, but
with discrepancies depending on the work categories (ICG, 25/04/05). Agriculture
and industry were more decentralised, and markets were authorised (ICG,
25/04/05). It seems that well-supplied markets have flourished and that informal
local markets have also increased (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04). There was also widespread
development of cooperative activities, such as sale of handicrafts, snacks, or
shoe or bicycle repair (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04).
Persistence of food insecurity
While some Koreans have prospered, the situation seems poor for most due,
among other things, to hyperinflation. With the breakdown of the PDS and the
development of a market economy, food insecurity had become more related to the
capacity of the families to command resources (USCHRNK, 2005). People who could
benefit from foreign exchange seemed more able to cope with the present system (USCHRNK,
2005). The physical proximity of surplus areas was also a factor affecting food
security (Noland, 07/2003). According to WFP/FAO, at least 30% of the working
age force was under-employed or unemployed, and wages were reduced to below
subsistence levels in 2004 (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04). The unemployment rate was double
for women compared to men. Moreover, even people with a stable job seemed to
engage in commercial transaction to increase their income (Seong-Ho, 03/03).
Coping strategies, such as receiving food from relatives in rural areas,
gathering wild food (80% of families in urban, and 65% in rural areas), using
alternative foods such as acorn flour, or sea and riverweed, cultivating small
gardens, and bartering personal belongings were widespread (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04;
USCHRNK, 2005). According to WFP/FAO, the most vulnerable were people dependent
on the PDS with only one income and several dependents (FAO/WFP, 22/11/04).
Reinstallation of the Public food Distribution System in late 2005
It is unclear to what extend the PDS has remained operational for the
majority of the population. The PDS seemed to have been only a marginal source
of food for years, at least in the north, according to recent testimonies from
refugees in China. The complete abolition of the system was denied by the North
Korean government when it was raised by South Korean media in 2004, but it is
thought that the PDS only continued to operate regularly in major urban centres
(AT, 15/01/05). It seems that the PDS rations varied between 200 and 300 g/pers/day
between 1998 and 2004, depending on the year, with important variations between
counties and months (USCHRNK, 2005). In November 1998, the three best counties
received an average of 350 g/pers/day, while the three worst counties only
received an average of 125g/pers/day (WFP/FAO, 29/06/1999). Rations received by
farmers at the collective farms seemed higher than rations distributed through
the PDS (USCHRNK, 2005). The government of DPRK announced in October 2005 that
the PDS will be reinstalled at a ration of 500 g/pers/day and that trade in
grains was banned, which also suggests that prior to this the PDS was probably
not fully functional (HRW, 05/06). There have since been reports that the ration
distributed was smaller than 500 g/pers/day. Although grain trade has been
banned, it seems that black markets have continued to operate, and that prices
have markedly increased.
End of emergency food aid
Food aid has been significant since the beginning of this overall crisis with
a peak at 1.5 m MT in 2001, and a decline afterwards to 0.68 m MT in 2004 (INTERFAIS)
reflecting a tendency to fatigue by some donors due to diplomatic conflicts such
as the nuclear programme developed by DPRK (USCHRNK, 2005).
In mid-2005, North Korea asked the UN agencies and the international NGOs
working in the country to terminate humanitarian aid by the end of 2005
(Concern, 20/09/05; DPA, 22/09/05). North Korea also decided not to be part of
the humanitarian Consolidated Appeal Process in 2005 (AFP, 16/03/05). The
government stated that the emergency was over, and that the country currently
needs long-term projects and development assistance, only occasionally monitored
by expatriates (Concern, 20/09/05, Reuters, 10/10/05). It has been suggested
that North Korea would get privileged aid from donors, such as South Korea and
China, which might exert less monitoring (Chosun Iibo, 08/09/05). In 2006, North
Korea has asked South Korea for 500,000 MT of food and 450,000 MT of fertiliser
(Gov of RK, 27/04/06; Reuters, 02/05/06). WFP will continue its programme on a
smaller scale with 150,000 MT of food to support 1.9 m people, compared to about
500,000 MT of food to support 6 m people previously (Reuters, 11/05/06; WFP,
11/05/06). WFP will only work in 30 counties, and its presence in the field will
be reduced.
Nutrition situation
Before 1998, there were no comprehensive national nutrition surveys conducted
in the country, but observations in orphanages, nurseries, and kindergartens
seemed to indicate a worsening of the situation by mid-97 (see RNIS supplement
on North Korea; Katona-Apte, 1998). From 1998 onwards, national nutrition
surveys have been conducted every other year (CBS, 10/00; CBS, 11/02; CBS,
02/05; EU/UNICEF/WFP, 98), with a presence of expatriates in the field in the
1998, 2002, and 2004 surveys. However, a number of limitations render
interpretation of the results and analysis of the trends of the surveys
difficult. Firstly, access to the whole country was not available during the
surveys (table 7). The 1998 and 2002 surveys were estimated to have covered
about 71% and 75% of the total population, respectively. Coverage estimates were
not available for the other surveys. Secondly the methodology of selection of
clusters, families, and children, and the age range covered by the surveys,
varied (table 7). In addition, in the 2002 and 2004 surveys, only the youngest
child of the family was measured, although, when adjusted for the missing older
children, the prevalence of acute malnutrition didn't change significantly.
Table 7 Methodologies used in the surveys conducted in
DPR Korea, 1998-2004 (CBS, 10/00; CBS, 11/02; CBS, 02/05; EU/UNICEF/WFP, 98)
Although the surveys are not directly comparable due to the reasons cited
above, trends seem to indicate a gradual improvement of the nutrition situation,
with a diminution of acute malnutrition and stunting (table 8). Stunting in
children is mostly determined by ante-natal and early childhood conditions in
the first two years of life. The rate of stunting might then be taken to reflect
the conditions at the time of birth and early childhood of these children. If
rates of stunting recorded in the four surveys are plotted against the year of
birth (figure 14), it would seem to indicate that conditions were already very
poor at the beginning of the nineties and have improved since 97-98. The peak of
the famine is not reflected in this figure, which might be due to a combination
of different factors, such as the low birth rate during this period, especially
in the more affected families. In any case, the above analysis should be
regarded with caution due to the many uncertainties although the decrease in
stunting rates from over 60% to less than 40% in 6 years is quite remarkable.
Figure 14 Stunting in children aged over two years by year of birth and
survey
The results of the last survey, conducted in 2004, showed a situation which,
although greatly improved, was still precarious with an average wasting rate,
and a significant level of stunting (table 8). The wasting rate was comparable
with Afghanistan and Vietnam, while the stunting rate was again comparable to
Vietnam but lower than Afghanistan (Childinfo).
Table 8 Malnutrition in DPR Korea, 1998-2004 (CBS, 10/00; CBS, 11/02; CBS,
02/05; EU/UNICEF/WFP, 98)
Moreover, there were wide discrepancies between provinces (table 9). The
lowest rates of wasting were found in Nampo and Pyongyang cities, while the
highest rates, three-fold higher than in Pyongyang, were reported in Ryangang,
North and South Hamyong and South Hwanghae. Stunting followed the same pattern.
This is in line with the analysis of food security in the country (see above),
and the food consumption of the mothers, who reported the lowest frequency of
consumption of pulses/meat/fish/eggs in South Hamgyoung and Ryangang provinces.
Table 9 Malnutrition in DPR Korea by province, 2004 (CBS, 02/05)
Nutritional status of mothers of children aged less than two years, measured
by MUAC, showed that about 32% of the women were thin (MUAC < 22.5 cm) in 2002
and 2004. Moreover, of the 25% and 50% of the women who authorised haemoglobin
measurement in 2002 and 2004, respectively, about a third were anaemic (Haemoglobin
< 12 g/L).
Child feeding practices although less than adequate with only 65% to 70% of
the less than six-month olds exclusively breastfed, are still high compared to
some other countries. About 90% of the children were still breastfeeding at one
year but the percentage of breastfed children decreased rapidly after one year
of age.
Overall
It is difficult to analyse the food and nutrition situations in North Korea
due to the paucity and uncertainty of the reliability of information. It seems
however that the nutrition situation of the children surveyed in 2002 and 2004
compares with the regional average. Although the economic and agricultural
situation seems to have improved in recent years, it is still precarious. The
food security and nutrition situations in the country are still very fragile and
need continuous attention. Furthermore it is probable that the lower class,
thought to represent about one third of the population, is still likely to be
suffering the consequences of food insecurity more than the rest of the
population.
RNIS 22, December 1997
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