INTER-AGENCY SECURITY MANAGEMENT NETWORK
MEETING

Nairobi, 1-5 February 2010

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON) from 1 to 5 February 2010. A list of participants is attached at Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members is attached at Annex B. This is the first time the IASMN met in Nairobi and took the opportunity to meet with both the Kenya and Somalia Security Management Teams (SMT). The IASMN members wish to express their gratitude to UNON for hosting the meeting.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING

A. Report of the IASMN Steering Group

2. The Report of the IASMN Steering Group was provided to the members of the IASMN for their information.

B. Selection of IASMN Co-Chair

3. As a result of the sad loss of Mr. Satoru Tabusa, ILO Security Focal Point and Co-Chair of the IASMN, two options were put forth to select a new Co-Chair: (1) select an interim Co-Chair to complete Mr. Tabusa’s two-year term which would have ended at the end of 2010, and elect a new Co-Chair with effect from 1 January 2011, or (2) elect a new Co-Chair at this meeting for a two-year term to commence immediately.

4. Before a decision was taken to adopt option (1) above, it was agreed that the next Co-Chair of the IASMN should be nominated from one of the Specialized Agencies.

Recommendation:

5. It was unanimously agreed that Mr. Antonio Kamil-Mikhail, of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) would continue to Co-Chair the IASMN until the end of 2010. Thereafter, Ms. Magdalena Landry, of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) would serve as Co-Chair of the IASMN for a two year term commencing 1 January 2011.

C. Update on Saving Lives Together Meeting in Geneva

6. The IASMN was presented with an update on the outcome of the Conference on Saving Lives Together which was convened under the aegis of the IASC Steering Group on Security, in collaboration with UNDSS, at the end of October 2009, and asked to consider means by which to further develop a more cohesive collaboration between the
organizations of the UN System and the International NGO community through the SLT framework.

7. The IASMN recognized that the SLT initiative remains a work in progress, and to support its further development that a pilot would be initiated in several countries.

8. The IASMN reiterated that the SLT initiative could not be financed through UN regular funding and that donor funding must continue to be used to support its activities.

9. The IASMN also strongly supported the continued efforts of UNICEF and OCHA in addressing this issue within the IASC.

10. The Chair acknowledged a strong desire some INGOs to attend SMT meetings and noted that this must be carefully considered as the SMT is an internal UN mechanism which would normally pre-empt integration of all INGOs into the SMT. He reiterated the importance of ensuring the SLT initiative was undertaken as a joint effort as this would not work without a partnership with the Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Organizations.

Recommendations:

11. The IASMN reiterates its support of the SLT initiative and requests that the UN and the INGO community seek more structured means by which to collaborate. In this regard, the IASMN recognizes that the SLT is an ongoing effort, and must look to extra-budgetary funding sources to implement the initiative.

12. The IASMN should continue to be apprised of progress being made on the initiative, including any pilot project conducted under the auspices of the IASC, and that any security policy implications of SLT must be referred back to the IASMN for its consideration.

D. Supplemental Host Country Agreements

13. Under the aegis of the HLCM Steering Committee, the IASMN was informed that a pilot test of the supplemental agreement would be initiated in 15 selected countries to obtain feedback from Designated Officials and Host Governments to determine if the concept is valid and if there would be support for such an agreement before implementing it globally. Letters had already been sent by the USG, DSS to selected Designated Officials (DOs) inviting them to participate in the pilot.

14. The IASMN recognized that a supplementary agreement may encourage greater transparency, and a more consistent approach to security issues. However, many of the participants voiced what they perceived may be obstacles to the success of the pilot, such as the possibility of an adverse impact on present Host Country Agreements; the fact that not all countries have Host Country Agreements with the UN, and the reliance on DO pro-active involvement in the pilot. It was noted that consultations with the Permanent Missions of Member States in New York, prior to the start of the pilot, may serve to
provide additional support to the DOs in their efforts with the Host Government in their respective countries.

Recommendations:

15. To foster greater transparency in the UN security management system, the IASMN supports the development of a consistent approach between the Host Country authorities and DOs on security matters.

16. It was recognized that such an approach may be achieved by an agreement on security tailored on a country-specific basis.

17. It was agreed that UNDSS proceed with the preparatory work already underway to engage with selected DOs in determining the relevant issues to be addressed in such an agreement, its format, and the mechanisms by which it may be implemented.

18. The IASMN requests that UNDSS report on these consultations and propose next steps at its next regular meeting.

E. UNDSS personnel resources approved by ACABQ and Fifth Committee

19. The Director of Regional Operations, UNDSS, provided a short synopsis of the budget allocations approved for UNDSS for the biennium 2011-12 and of the new posts that had been approved by the General Assembly, through the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee.

20. ITU, speaking on behalf of the Specialized Agencies that had met just prior to the commencement of the IASMN meeting, highlighted the concerns that had been expressed about the lack of timely information sharing and consultations by UNDSS on the management review and the subsequent budget proposals that had been presented to the General Assembly. He further cited the need to proceed with a full business review to decentralize certain functions in UNDSS/DRO and for the IASMN to reinstate the consideration of budgetary matters on its agenda. In this respect, it was subsequently noted that a representative of the Finance and Budget Network of HLCM should be present at IASMN meetings in the context of any budgetary discussions.

21. Further comments from IASMN members included the need for UNDSS to ensure the coordination of its assets at the regional level. An emphasis was also put on the need for any business review to be predicated on results based management, i.e. a focus on services delivered rather than on the management of posts.

22. UNDSS responded that, regrettably, for a number of reasons, not least of which were the strict submission deadlines that needed to be adhered to, there was insufficient time for extensive consultation and that in the future, every effort would be made to ensure full transparency and the allocation of ample time for full consultation. Furthermore, the Chair specifically stated that the new posts earmarked for Security Information and Operation Cells (SIOC’s) were not set in stone and would be used in places where needed the most. It was added that UNDSS was to present proposals for emergency funding for
security enhancements for Pakistan at the next resumed session of the Fifth Committee to be held in March 2010. However, the UN Controller had decided that those costs should be cost-shared.

23. Additional concerns brought to the attention of IASMN members included the lack of transparency in UNDSS’ recruitment process, the need for coordination in the staffing policy across the UNSMS, the value of using the recently benchmarked validations prepared by DFS to develop generic job descriptions for security posts, the need to better utilize existing resources within the organization to support UNDSS’ work and the need to obtain information management tools to support a modern security department.

24. The Chair confirmed that UNDSS was soon to conduct an independent study to encompass mobility, recruitment and career development issues within UNDSS, agreed with the need for more transparency and consultation and supported the establishment of greater synergy on a multi-disciplinary basis both within the UN Secretariat and with its partners in the UNSMS.

25. The IASMN recommended that:

   a. Budgetary Matters be included as an agenda item in the second meeting of the IASMN beginning with its second meeting in 2010,

   b. UNDSS provide the recently approved jointly-financed budget, in order that IASMN members may assess cost implications and factor any adjustments into their respective budgets,

   c. UNDSS review its budget within the framework of performance and results-based management and report on this to the IASMN Steering Group.

   d. A representative of the Finance and Budget Network be requested to attend the second regular meeting of the IASMN when budgetary matters are discussed,

   e. In coordination and cooperation with the IASMN and the Human Resources Network (HRN), UNDSS is to examine the feasibility of a coordinated security staffing policy within the UN security management system with a view to ensuring greater transparency in the recruitment and selection process,

   f. UNDSS create a framework by which synergies in the areas of budget, human resources and operations, both within the UN Secretariat and other organizations of the UN System, be established with a view to ensuring the optimum use of existing resources and enhancing deliverables,

   g. DFS/DPKO provide its completed benchmarking validation report on security occupational group to UNDSS in order that the department may consider incorporating the findings and content of the report in the planned department human resources review project.
h. All members of the IASMN would provide all appropriate and necessary information to contribute to and further these efforts.

F. HLCM and CEB meetings update

26. A status report was provided by the representative of the Chair of the HLCM Steering Committee on the HLCM and CEB meetings that took place in the latter half of 2009 during which the USG, DSS had given a well-received presentation on the safety and security of UN staff and premises. The IASMN was also informed that a revised Framework for Accountability had been endorsed which would soon be presented to the General Assembly.

27. The IASMN was also presented with further information on the efforts of the HRN to develop communication brochures for all staff and ‘non-staff’ on security-related entitlements (which had recently been completed), implement a rapid response mechanism for the deployment of administrative personnel at times of crisis, review service-incurred compensation, and examine means by which to improve security measures for national staff. The latter two issues would require further input from both the Finance and Budget and Legal Networks before being considered at the fall session of the HLCM.

28. References were also made to the upcoming HLCM meeting in Turin, wherein endorsement of the new Security Level System would be sought together with the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk and the draft policy paper on Estate Safety and Security Policy. It was also expected that an update on the lessons learned in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti would be presented at this meeting.

29. The Staff Federations reiterated their concern regarding national staff, in particular their exclusion from local SMTs and their lack of entitlement to MORSS which they hoped would be taken up by the HRN. While the issue of national staff representation on SMTs was not favoured by some members based on the reasoning that this could jeopardize the security of national staff, it was recognized that what was key to national staff involvement in decisions impacting on their security was ensuring proper channels of communication. The representative of the Chair of the HLCM Steering Committee emphasized the importance that the Chair attached to staff representation in the Steering Committee and confirmed that discussions were still ongoing regarding national staff entitlements.

30. Regarding the Steering Committee itself, the point was made that when the Committee was established it was done so on a time-limited basis to bring together the HR and FB Networks together with the IASMN to implement specific recommendations emanating from the Brahimi report. As such, it was expected that once the Steering Committee completed its work then it would cease to exist.

Recommendations:

31. The IASMN welcomes the status report on the work of the HLCM Steering Committee and the outcomes of the HLCM and CEB meetings as they relate to safety
and security and acknowledged the work of the Steering Committee and its participating organizations.

32. The IASMN takes note of the report provided and of the results achieved through the HLCM Steering Committee.

G. Report and briefing on the Security Level System

33. The report of the UNDSS led UNSMS Project Group established by the HLCM Steering Committee was presented to the IASMN by representatives of the Project Group. The presentation included a detailed briefing on the new SLS, resulting feedback from the pilot tests which were conducted at five field locations with varying security environments and the recommendations associated with both the SLS and the Guidelines on Acceptable Risk. Those who participated in the pilot tests overwhelmingly agreed that the Security Level System was more user-friendly, and provided a systematic objective means of evaluating threat in a certain geographic area/location. Furthermore, it resulted in determining more accurate security levels which supported the new philosophy of "how to stay" rather than "when to leave". In addition, the SLS allowed for a more transparent process in assessing threats and would contribute to de-politicizing Security Levels, thus allowing for a more accurate reflection of the security environment on the ground.

34. The Chair confirmed that the new SLS would be completely de-linked from decisions regarding the relocation/evacuation of staff and eligible dependents, thus eliminating the automatic triggering of security-related entitlements. Concern was expressed by some members of the IASMN and representatives of the HRN and the Staff Federations regarding the de-linking of relocation and evacuation decisions under the new SLS. The Chair reassured the meeting that the decision to relocate/evacuate staff and dependents would nevertheless continue to rest with the Designated Official in consultation with the SMT. In cases where this could not be agreed upon at the country level, then the USG, DSS, together with the Executive Group on Security (EGS) may be convened to recommend appropriate action be taken. The Chair further stressed that relocation and evacuation decisions are mitigating measures and if those measures are not de-linked under the new SLS then it may all too easily be perceived that the SLS has no more added value than the existing Security Phase System.

35. Some concern was also expressed regarding any additional financial implications that might be incurred as a result of the new SLS. UNDSS assured IASMN members that there was no financial impact attached to the replacement of the current Security Phase System with the SLS, and furthermore, that no additional funds would be needed for SLS training as UNDSS would use existing training funds for this purpose by re-prioritizing its training activities in 2010.

36. Some questions were raised regarding the proposed implementation date of 1 January 2011 as some members wished to see the SLS implemented as soon as possible. However, the Chair confirmed that its implementation could not be undertaken until this had been endorsed and approved by HLCM and CEB at their next (spring) sessions. In anticipation of those endorsements, the Chair encouraged participants to begin, as soon as
possible, the process of educating senior staff within their respective organizations on the new system. The UNDSS Training and Development Section was tasked to prepare a detailed training schedule and to share it with the IASMN.

Recommendations:

37. The IASMN strongly endorses the new proposed SLS, including de-linking of security-related entitlements under the new system and recognized that this was a major step in enhancing security risk management.

38. Noting that the new SLS will need to be well understood throughout the UN system, and that training is paramount to its success, the IASMN agrees to collectively promote the training initiatives with regard to the SLS and make available the human resources to assist in this respect. UNDSS will also make available relevant information and training materials as well as human resources for this purpose.

39. The IASMN notes the concerns of the HRN as they relate to the need for transparency and impartiality in the determination of security levels and decisions regarding the relocation/evacuation of staff and eligible dependents under the new SLS and the related financial implications of such decisions.

40. The Project Group also presented a segment on the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk and reported that the pilot found unanimous support for the concept of acceptable risk. In order to have acceptable risk, the benefits of any given programme would need to outweigh the costs of conducting it, thus reinforcing the need for determining programme criticality.

41. The subject of programme criticality ignited discussions on who should determine whether or not a program is deemed to be critical. The Chair emphasized that in a critical threat situation it was vital that a decision making apparatus was in place to consider such questions and that this was an issue that stretched beyond security considerations.

Recommendation:

42. The IASMN reiterates its support for the Guidelines on Acceptable Risk and recognizes that this serves as a valuable tool in implementing programmes. However, the IASMN also notes that a further examination of the issue of programme criticality needs to be undertaken outside the realm of the IASMN, as programme criticality should not be determined by the security management system. In this regard, the IASMN agrees that a broader discussion on programme criticality needs to be conducted at a higher level within the appropriate pillar of the Chief Executives Board (CEB).

H. Report on Training

43. The report on the UNDSS 2009 training programme was presented, followed by a report on the proposed training for 2010 and beyond. Despite limited staff resources, UNDSS accomplishments in this area were numerous and encompassed many different facets of operational security training with a wide variety of groups.
44. It was noted that in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake, it became evident that the UNDSS Mass Casualty Incident training that was implemented in MINUSTAH was instrumental in saving the lives of many staff. The UNDSS Mobile Medical Training Team would continue to undertake similar training in other high risk areas.

45. The ensuing discussion recognized the need for the expansion of specific types of training. Considering that UNDSS TDS could only provide services within the limited financial and human resources available, the IASMN welcomed the proposal of the Security Training Working Group to accredit security trainers from the AFPs to conduct various UNDSS security training courses. It was also noted that more people should be trained in Hostage Incident Management, thus increasing the pool from which trained HIM advisers could be deployed, regardless of whether the incident involved their specific organization.

46. It was also suggested that there was a need to develop a system that would allow individuals who were being reassigned from one country and had completed a SSAFE programme, to receive credit for common subjects that appear in the SSAFE programme of the new country of assignment. This would recognize that the individual had attended SSAFE training and permit that individual to receive training only on new subjects, thus reducing the amount of time spent in such training. In addition, it was noted that many headquarters-based security and other personnel who undertook mission travel to certain locations needed to complete the SSAFE training beforehand, which was both time consuming and costly. It was requested that UNDSS examine this requirement and determine whether a change in policy would be appropriate to allow individuals traveling on very short missions to be exempt from SSAFE training or whether other alternatives could be made available to achieve both time and cost savings.

47. Although the training initiatives that were discussed were welcomed, it was also noted that more work was needed to ensure that the security training needs of all UN personnel are met. In this regard, the need for specific training programmes for Security Focal Points was cited. In response, UNDSS pointed out that those SFPs who desired additional training should attend the Regional Designated Official Workshops presented by UNDSS. A list of those workshops was available in the Training Schedule on the UNDSS website.

**Recommendations:**

48. The IASMN endorses:

a. The new approach in training Designated Officials Ad Interim and Security Management Teams. IASMN members are to ensure that their respective representatives attend and support those training sessions.

b. The new Intermediate Training Programme standard and supports the training by sending its newly promoted P4 officers to the course.
c. Continued implementation of the SSAFE Programme, ensuring that while common elements serve as a baseline to the maximum extent possible, the training must address individual country needs.

d. UNDSS to examine a policy change regarding SSAFE training for individuals on short-term missions, and for individuals who completed SSAFE training in one country, not having to retake common subjects when reassigned to another country with a SSAFE programme.

e. The introduction and implementation of E-learning for Security Managers, as well as Professional and General Service staff.

f. The concept of extending HIM training to AFPs with a commitment to deploying those trained, in support of UNDSS HIM crisis response.

49. The IASMN, recognizing the strict timelines in place for submission of the 2012-13 biennium budget, further requests that UNDSS submit at the next session of the IASMN, an overview of its training needs, the resources required and its training delivery strategy.

50. Noting the need for greater consistency and commonality of security training, the IASMN urges its members to devise common training platforms, where applicable, through the IASMN Security Training Working Group in order to make maximum and effective use of training resources to avoid duplications and aid in the long term planning of security training programmes.

51. The IASMN recommends that where feasible, Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Organizations provide their respective representatives with security briefings/training prior to deployment and to the security briefing conducted in-country.

52. The IASMN noted that specific security training products may need to be developed for national staff.

I. WFP Female Staff Security Training

53. Following up on the work undertaken by IFAD on female staff security training, WFP, as Chair of the Working Group on Security for Female Staff had initiated a project to develop an additional security training programme for female staff assigned to the field. In this respect, a consultant had been recruited to develop and send a questionnaire to female staff in the field. The major feedback from female national staff indicated concerns regarding sexual harassment in the work place, domestic violence, the need for instruction on vehicle maintenance and what to do after the evacuation of international staff. The main concerns of female international staff centered on carjacking and hostage taking. A security training programme will be formally tested with IFAD and the World Bank in March 2010, and once completed will be made available through UNDSS to all interested Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Organizations in the same manner as the IFAD training programme.
54. The WFP project was well received and supported by the IASMN. However, it was recognized that there was a need for additional female trainers to enable discussions of certain issues. It was also pointed out that security awareness training had a tendency to be male-orientated and that perhaps male trainers were not sensitive enough to the security concerns of female staff. This warranted further examination to ensure gender issues were mainstreamed into the overall security training.

55. In light of the above, it was noted that from a policy standpoint, there was a need for all members to review their current security training programmes to ensure that they are presented with the appropriate regard for gender sensitivity. Although TDS was mandated to provide general security training and materials, it would take whatever actions may be needed to ensure that specific recommendations emanating from this review are taken into account.

Recommendations:

56. The IASMN requests that current security training programmes be examined to ensure that gender issues are mainstreamed within those programmes. Where it is deemed necessary, additional types of specific training for female staff should be identified.

57. The IASMN recommends that WFP continue to take the lead on this issue and provide a progress report at the next regular meeting of the IASMN.

J. Special session with Kenya DO and SMT members

58. Taking advantage of the unique opportunity of holding the IASMN meeting at the UN Office in Nairobi, the Designated Official for Kenya and members of the Security Management Team were invited to meet with the IASMN. The direct interaction between IASMN members and the Kenya SMT provided valuable insight into and firsthand knowledge of the various security issues and challenges confronting UN operations in Kenya.

59. After thanking the DO and SMT members for agreeing to address the IASMN, the Chair clarified that the mandate of the IASMN focused on developing security management policies for the entire UN security management system.

60. The main concern of the Kenya SMT centered on the current upgrading of the hardship classification for Nairobi from C to B which had an adverse impact on staff morale and on the recruitment and retention of staff. The SMT expressed the view that the security situation in Nairobi had not improved, and therefore any resulting change in the classification of the duty station that may have been based on an upward security classification contradicted the current situation which still saw violent criminality, threats deriving from the possible infiltration of dangerous elements through the porous borders with Kenya’s neighbors and staff living under self-imposed curfews, all of which only served to contribute to a high level of anxiety among staff. Compounding this was the fact that, unfortunately, the Government of Kenya was not fully prepared to provide some 150 security/police officers needed to secure the UN premises.
61. The Designated Official stated that the Security Level System that had been piloted in Nairobi might result in being an enhanced tool for security management. However, it was highlighted by one SMT member that there still exists an inability by the UN to really address the national/international staff dilemma which saw many international staff living in an enhanced security environment while many national staff were frightened to return to their homes in the evening.

62. It was cited that Nairobi is being used more and more by Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Organizations as a major hub in Africa. It serves as the medical evacuation center for 16 different countries as well as the designated safe haven for a similar number. As such, the prominence of UN activities in the country only serves to bring security issues to the fore. It was reiterated that the security of staff is compromised not only by direct threats but rather by the lack of ability of the Host Country and the UN to provide proper security support when incidents occur. In addition, the politicized view of the UN emanating from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, had only served to increase staff anxiety about the targeting of the UN, and possible terrorist attacks in Kenya. The establishment of a Security Information and Operations Cell (SIOIC), in conjunction with enhanced Host Country provision of security and mitigation measures, would prove beneficial in light of the expansion of the UN presence in the country.

63. The Chair, after clarifying certain issues with respect to the hardship re-classification of Nairobi, concluded the special session by thanking the DO and SMT members for their candor and helpful comments.

K. Special session with Somalia DO and SMT members

64. Also taking advantage of the IASMN meeting in Nairobi, the DO and SMT for Somalia were invited to meet with the IASMN. The DO opened the meeting with remarks on the security situation in Somalia, highlighting the need to formulate appropriate security policies.

65. The DO and SMT highlighted a number of issues for consideration of the IASMN including: the cumbersome security procedures required for those who needed to work in Somalia; the financially inefficient common services and the need to find a levy approach for common cost elements; the lack of exceptional measures for hazard pay for those responsible for implementing programmes in Somalia, but operating outside of its borders; gender issues and the inability of the counseling services, combined with the lack of training available to deal with issues of sexual violence; the need to distinguish between categories of staff and non-staff; the lack of availability of medical services in the mission area which results in the evacuation of staff to Nairobi; the need for better communication among teams in the region; the major challenges of dealing with the vulnerability and security of national staff; and the need for broader risk management that goes beyond the boundaries of one country and one SMT.

66. The Chair noted that some of the issues cited went beyond the purview of security issues and needed to be addressed on a broader level within the UN inter-agency machinery.
67. The IASMN agreed that the Chair would bring a ‘non-paper’ entitled “United Nations Operations in Difficult Security Environments”– Issues arising from meetings with members of the Kenya and Somalia SMTs to the attention of the HLCM.

L. Additional MAIP coverage for NCBT incidents

68. The proposed insurance coverage for cases of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Terrorism (NCBT) incidents was found to be excessively priced and to provide inadequate coverage. In addition, many Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Organizations have their own individual MAIP plans and some would look into what provisions already exist. It was generally agreed that the threat of such incidents to support this type of insurance coverage, combined with the excessively high premiums and the lack of clarification of the UN’s corporate policy on this issue does not warrant the coverage as offered at this time.

Recommendation:

69. The IASMN does not support obtaining NCBT insurance under the terms presently offered by the insurance carrier.

M. Report on Critical Incident Stress

70. The report on the activities undertaken by the Critical Incident Stress Management Unit (CISMU) during 2009 was welcomed. The report had outlined the achievements of CISMU on coordination issues, strengthening UN response preparedness on Critical Stress Prevention and Management and on improving the access of UN staff to quality psychosocial services.

71. The members recognized the value and good work of CISMU and many supported the need for additional locally-recruited counselors. However, concern was expressed about the increasing cost at the country level of providing for more counselors, and there was a call for better coordination of the existing counselors deployed during a crisis.

72. The placement of CISMU within UNDSS was debated briefly, with the suggestion made that perhaps consideration could be given to situating CISMU in either the Medical Services Division or elsewhere in the UN Department of Management. It was noted that CISMU had originally been placed in UNDSS to facilitate quick responses in crisis and post-crisis situations. The Chair added that it would be within his prerogative, as USG, DSS to decide on the placement of CISMU.

Recommendations:

73. The IASMN endorses the following recommendations:

   a. Critical Incident Stress counsellors should be a part of the UNDSS regional team being tested in Nairobi to enhance the provision of psychosocial service and support as a part of the pilot concept.
b. Greater emphasis should be on locally-recruited counselors as an integral part of the field security structure and these positions should be at the NOC level.

c. Additional counselors should be trained in hostage incident management. Their role as an integral member of the HIM team should be fully recognized, and clearly stated in the guidelines on hostage incident management.

d. Regional cell meetings should be formalized as a forum to discuss and address regional challenges with regards to psychosocial crisis intervention and preventative activities.

74. With regard to the IASMN encouraging SMTs with part-time counsellors supporting the cost sharing of locally-based counsellors on a fulltime basis, the IASMN requests that UNDSS provide an inventory of all UNCIS counsellors and a plan for coordinating these resources to the next regular meeting of the IASMN.

75. The IASMN continues to fully support the participation of CISMU in the UN Staff/Stress Counsellors Special Interest Group of the HRN.

N. Report on Information Management Systems

76. The report on progress made by the Information Management Section was presented and welcomed by the IASMN. It covered activities completed during 2009 and an overview of the challenges faced by UNDSS with respect to information management systems. Several members requested linking their respective travel systems to ISECT and were informed that this would be possible as several organizations had already established this interface. Those wishing to do so should contact the UNDSS Chief of IMS.

Recommendations:

77. The IASMN took note of:

a. The major achievements made in 2009 and recommends that UNDSS examine how security information is managed within the UNSMS and what further improvements may be made.

b. The request from several agencies to integrate their travel systems with ISECT and welcomes the support of UNDSS to implement this interface.

O. Replacement for the Field Security Handbook

78. As requested by the IASMN at its meeting in London, UNDSS had incorporated suggested changes to the Table of Contents of the new policy handbook and provided a progress report on the various chapters and sections together with a revised development schedule.
79. In addition, three titles for the new policy handbook were discussed and a new title was selected.

Recommendations:

80. The IASMN agreed to replace the Field Security Handbook with a “UN Security Management System Policy Manual”.

81. The IASMN agreed with the additions to the Table of Contents and development schedule proposed and UNDSS will report back on progress at the next regular meeting of the IASMN.

P. Update on the WFP Office Attack in Pakistan Lessons Learned

82. The Director of Regional Operations, UNDSS provided an information update on the terrorist attack on the WFP office in Islamabad, Pakistan. He explained that the planning and execution of the attack had strictly adhered to Al-Qaeda methods of operation. Lessons learned from the attack included the need to implement hostile surveillance and reconnaissance detection training and adequate supervision of security guards, further requirements to closely interact with National Guard forces utilized by the UN to be under the oversight of UN Security Officers, an additional need for specific access control guidelines and strict compliance monitoring, the mitigation of human error as much as possible by ensuring the provision of decent wages and the employment of intelligent and observant people to ensure that procedural and physical weaknesses are identified and corrected.

83. The Chair took this opportunity to reiterate to the IASMN the status of the UNDSS request to the Fifth Committee for emergency funding for security enhancements for Pakistan. In addition to citing the UN Controller’s request that such funds be cost-shared, the Chair clarified that the Pakistan request needs to identify those measures that are strictly under the remit of UNDSS and those that should be jointly financed. In the case of Afghanistan, agreement had been reached for UNAMA to request additional funding in the context of its own budget. One suggestion was put forth that a generic emergency request be submitted, i.e. without specifying for which countries the funds would be used.

Q. Estate Safety and Security

84. At its August 2009 meeting in London, the IASMN requested that UNDSS revise its draft Estate Safety and Security Policy. After extensive discussion, the policy was further revised by the IASMN and is attached at Annex D. In addition, the IASMN was briefed on the Estate Vulnerability Questionnaire containing 32 questions that was developed by UNDSS to establish, for the first time, a global database of all UN premises. The questionnaire will shortly be launched to the field and all security officers, including those from the Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Organizations will be requested to provide information on all the premises in their area of responsibility. The purpose of this effort would be to establish a database containing standardized critical security attributes in order to use this data to feed into a decision making support tool, i.e. Expert Choice, which would be used to identify the most vulnerable premises. This would enable
UNDSS and the Agencies, Funds and Programmes to identify and prioritize the most vulnerable premises for urgent action using factual information to inform key decision makers accordingly. It was suggested that to supplement this data collection, photographs as well as data on the numbers of security officers in each location would also be collected.

85. Several members commented that decisions on common premises should not be solely at the discretion of the DO. The Chair emphasized that should there be disagreement between the DO and the SMT, the EGS could be convened to resolve the matter.

**Recommendation:**

86. The IASMN recognizes the need for an Estate Safety and Security Policy to be submitted to the HLCM within prescribed timelines and fully endorses the Policy as revised, on the understanding that further collaboration will be undertaken between UNDSS and the IASMN to develop a mechanism for the implementation of this policy by prioritizing and developing specific standards.

**R. Draft Occupational Health and Safety Policy in the UN System**

87. This paper, presented by Dr. Ling Kituyi on behalf of Dr. Davey, Chair of the Medical Directors Working Group (MDWG) responded to a request from the HLCM to the MDWG to develop and prioritize specific proposals that would update and enhance the provision of health care in the UN system.

88. The paper outlined the concern of the MDWG for staff operating in the deep field and the need for senior managers to take staff health and safety into consideration when deciding on programme implementation. It was obvious that a flexible framework would need to be followed in order to make allowances for differences between duty stations and implementing Agencies, Funds and Programmes. The MDWG requested IASMN endorsement of the paper to develop a standard occupational health and safety policy across the UN System.

**Recommendation:**

89. The IASMN strongly supports the cross-disciplinary initiative to develop a comprehensive and well managed relevant occupational health and safety framework for the UN System, and requests that the MDWG provide an update on its progress to the IASMN at its next meeting.

**S. Other matters**

a. 2010 Steering Group and IASMN meeting schedule:

I. IASMN meeting in Nairobi, 1-5 February 2010

II. Steering Group Meeting at UNLB Brindisi, 4-6 May 2010
III. IASMN meeting in Vienna, 21-25 June 2010

IV. Steering Group Meeting in Nov-Dec 2010 – to be discussed and decided at the Steering Group Meeting in May 2010.

b. Haiti: The USG, DSS provided an update on the situation in Haiti three weeks after the tragic earthquake. Many thanks were expressed for all those who aided in the crisis. Special note was made of the fortitude of national staff who returned to work as soon as they could despite suffering personal losses and of the resiliency of the international staff in the circumstances.

The USG, DSS took this opportunity to comment once again on the lack of a modern information management capacity in the UN, a concern made more acute considering the extensive reach of the UN’s operations and activities. In the case of Haiti, the UN was not facing an insurgency or hostile population, there was no need for armoured vehicles nor was the UN faced with overwhelming security issues. The UN was struck by a natural disaster – one that demonstrated the importance of preparedness and highlighted both the construction of the buildings the UN chooses to occupy and the real lack of IT and geo-spatial information. He subsequently encouraged IASMN members to establish, test and maintain business continuity plans.

The IASMN extends its deepest condolences to the families and colleagues of those lost in the Haiti earthquake and would like to put on record its gratitude for the dedicated support, ongoing assistance and tireless work undertaken by many across the UN system to aid those family members, survivors and colleagues impacted by this crisis.

c. Cost-shared budget: Noting the increases in the global cost-shared budget for UNDSS, several Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Organizations expressed the difficulty they faced in supporting the high costs of security. Concerns were reiterated over the lack of consultation and transparency, and the recent decision taken by the UN Controller that any request for emergency funds must be cost-shared rather than be requested from the UN’s regular budget. The AFPOs pointed out that even at the local level, costs charged are not transparent and considering that country level budgets must be approved by the SMT, the AFPOs should at least be in a position to determine what the money is being used to support.

d. The criteria used to prepare the cost-shared budget were not completely understood and greater clarity was requested. UNDSS would provide a detailed report specifically addressing the following at the next IASMN Steering Group meeting in Brindisi and the USG, DSS agreed to:

   a. Conduct a review of the Jointly-Financed Account and, as previously noted in this report, Budget Matters will be a standing item on the agenda of the second annual meeting of the IASMN.
b. Conduct a survey on cost-sharing of security at the country level to include an examination of funds spent, categories of expenditure and accuracy of headcount. UNDSS will provide a report on the status of this survey at the next meeting of the IASMN Steering Group.
PROVISIONAL AGENDA

1. Report of the IASMN Steering Group (CRP 2)
2. Selection of IASMN Co-Chair (CRP 3)
3. Update on Saving Lives Together Meeting in Geneva (CRP 4)
4. Supplemental Host Country Agreement on Security (CRP 5)
5. DSS personnel resources approved by ACABQ and Fifth Committee (CRP 6)
6. HLCM and CEB meetings Update (CRP 7)
7. Report and briefing on the Security Level System (CRP 8)
8. Report on Training (CRP 9)
9. WFP Female Staff Security Training (CRP 10)
10. MAIP – additional coverage for NCBT incidents (CRP 11)
11. Special session with Kenya DO and SMT members (1530, Tue, 2 Feb)
12. Report on Critical Incident Stress (CRP 12)
15. Special session with Somalia DO and SMT members (1530, Wed, 3 Feb)
16. Estate Safety and Security
   a. Revised Policy (CRP 15)
   b. DSS Estate Vulnerability Questionnaire and Database
   c. Decision Support Tool – Expert Choice
   d. Country Profile Database
17. Other matters

a. Proposed 2010 Steering Group and IASMN meeting schedule:
   i. IASMN meeting in Nairobi, 1-5 February
      1. HLCM meeting – 22-23 February (Turin)
      2. CEB meeting – 8-9 April
   ii. Steering Group meeting – 4-6 May in Brindisi (Confirmed)
   iii. IASMN meeting – 19-23 July in Vienna (Confirmed)
      1. HLCM meeting - TBD
      2. CEB meeting – TBD
   iv. Steering Group meeting – November- December (TBD)

b. CRP 16 – Health and Safety Policy MSD
Annex B

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIR
Mr. Gregory B. Starr (DSS)
Ms. Anne Marie Pinou (DSS)

SECRETARY

Agency, Funds And Programmes and Other Entities of the United Nations
Security Management System

Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Mr. Andy Clinton

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Mr. Alan Drew

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Mr. Graham Farmer

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Mr. Llywelyn Skidmore

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Mr. Moshabesha

International Criminal Court (ICC)
Mr. Lassi Kuusinen

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
Mr. Antonio Kamil-Mikhail

International Labour Organization (ILO)
Mr. Brian Wenk

International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Mr. Warren J. Young

International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Mr. John Shabatura

International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
Mr. Claude Vadeboncoeur

Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
Mr. Peter Koopmans
Mr. Fredric Claus

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Mr. Mourad Wahba

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
Mr. Naqib Noory

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Mr. Paul Stromberg
Mr. David Schneider
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

Mr. Paul Farrell
Mr. Arve Skog

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

Mr. Andrei Lazykin

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Ms. Magdalena Landry

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

Mr. Peter Marshall

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Mr. Kevin O’Hanlon

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)

Mr. Thomas Gerstenecker

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

Ms. Laura Londen

United Nations Volunteers (UNV)

Mr. Sven Amidi Madsen

Universal Postal Union (UPU)

Mr. David Bowers

World Food Programme (WFP)

Mr. Mick Lorentzen
Mr. Stephen Glunin

World Health Organization (WHO)

Mr. Xavier Leus
Mr. Patrick Beaufour

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

Mr. Jan Van Hecke

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HLCM Human Resources Network (UNHRN)  
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)  
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  
Ms. Bonnie N. Adkins

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Mr. David Kaatrud

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)  
Mr. Abraham Mathai

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)  
Mr. Timothy Collins

Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)  
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Observers  
Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations System (CCISUCA)  
Sgt Moses Luvaï  
UNON Staff Council Rep  
Mr. S. Ackumey-Affzie

Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations (FICSA)
Annex C

Note by the Under-Secretary-General, DSS

United Nations Operations in Difficult Security Environments

Issues arising from meetings with members of the SMTs from Somalia and Kenya

1. The IASMN met with members of the Kenya and Somalia SMTs in Nairobi on 2 and 3 February 2010. During the meetings and in the ensuing discussions, it was proposed that the issues raised by these SMTs presented features common to the needs to work in complex security environments, such as those faced by the United Nations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, though the most extreme case could be seen to be Somalia.

2. The DO for Kenya informed the IASMN of various challenges facing the Kenya SMT. Particularly, although a field location, Kenya is also host to two global headquarters. These organizations have to compete with other HQ locations in attracting staff and, in view of the prevailing insecurity, this is a challenge. It was requested that the organization review the comprehensive package for the global headquarters.

3. In such a complex security environment as that in Somalia, the United Nations faces the challenge of carrying out operations where it is difficult to maintain a continuous and adequate presence of international staff in order to ensure all aspects of country operations. Some of the topics that were raised by the Somalia SMT in particular include:

A. Staff issues:

a. Inconsistencies and the lack of clarity in the designation of ‘staff’ and ‘non-staff’ across the UN system which is compounded by the multiplicity of contractual arrangements still in use.

b. Gender/cultural issues with respect to safety and deployment.

c. Problems related to the movement of national staff from one country to another (e.g. Somali passport holders traveling to Kenya and to/from Hargeisa; contractual status precluding issuances of UNLPs to facilitate travel).

d. The lack of sufficiently attractive compensation and incentives to ensure recruitment and retention of qualified staff in difficult and high-risk environments.
e. The lack of information regarding the whereabouts of all eligible dependents of national staff.

f. The lack of reporting by international staff of the presence of eligible dependants in cases where their dependants remain in their home country, which becomes of particular concern in a high-risk environment.

B. Operations Issues

a. The need for international staff to operate from a neighbouring country, necessitating visits to the area of operations under heavy security and complex logistic arrangements.

b. Reconciling the reliance on national staff to run the operations with the need for national staff to keep a low profile for security reasons.

c. Rigidity in the application of MOSS (e.g. in cases where staff ceilings change), which leads to operational, procedural, and financial problems.

C. System Issues

a. Shared security has implications on the management of the commonality of training/procedures and is impacted if even one partner withdraws.

b. Country cost shared security budgets that are so high as to render it difficult for the UN and the AFPs to cost share these budgets and for UNDP to recover its costs.

c. Need for a link, at the sub-regional level, to capture the wider security and political developments in the area of operations and neighbouring countries, some of which have a significant UN presence.

d. Absence of common compound leadership/management in field locations, e.g. AFPs unwilling to lead in Bosasso (i.e. (raising) cost and accountability issues).

e. Importance of programme criticality exercise which incorporates alternative modes of delivery. This exercise could serve as a tool for decision-making.

f. The Somali operations pose an additional threat to Kenya and thus places additional constraints on the Kenya SMT.

4. In summary, the IASMN wishes to bring attention to the following concerns based on its analysis of these situations:
a. The need for precise definitions of 'staff' and 'non-staff' and a clear determination of the assistance that can be afforded to 'non-staff' under the umbrella of the UN security management system.

b. The identification of the contractual modalities which allow the UN and AFPs to employ nationals who may not be considered as 'staff'.

c. The limitation, as a financial tool, of determining the local cost-shared model based on head count thus supporting the need for a change in the security planning to be fully integrated into the programme's budget.

d. The need for information sharing to underlie cross border security management.

e. The need to assess the impact of UN operations on neighbouring countries, the legal status of UN staff in these conditions, and the management of travel and transport for international and national personnel.

f. The need to address the inadequacies of medical facilities which increases the burden on field security officers and leaves the agencies, funds and programmes in possible breach of its duty of care.
Annex D

United Nations Estate Safety And Security Policy
(Draft revised at IASMN meeting, 4 Feb 2010)

A. Introduction

1. The primary responsibility for the security and protection of personnel employed by the United Nations system organizations, their spouse and other recognized dependants and property and of the organizations’ property rests with the Host Government. This responsibility flows from every government’s normal and inherent function of maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction. In the case of international organizations and their officials, the government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations and relevant agreements the Government may have with the individual organizations.

2. Without prejudice to the above and while not abrogating the responsibility of the Host Government for its obligations, the United Nations has a duty as an employer to reinforce and, where necessary, supplement the capacity of the Host Government to fulfill these obligations in circumstances where United Nations personnel are working in areas which are subject to conditions of insecurity which require mitigation measures beyond those which the Host Government can reasonably be expected to provide.

3. The organizations of the United Nations System\(^1\) rely on the Host Government for the provision safe and secure facilities to significantly reduce and/or mitigate any hostile or criminal threat and risk to mandated programmes and assets.

4. There is, however, an acknowledgement of the limitations in some Host Governments’ capacity to provide such estate, thus the responsibility returns to the organizations of the United Nations System to implement adequate measures to secure their personnel and assets. Such measures, in many cases, could be long-term in nature, and would require necessary investment of resources, which may have significant budget implications.

5. This policy addresses estate safety and security concerns in line with the three overarching principles of the “how to stay” approach to security management, “no programme without security” and “no security without resources”, and sets forth the following three Chief Executive Board guiding principles to enhance security and safety at United Nations estate world-wide:

- **Structured Approach.** This policy is an integral part of existing policies of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS);

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\(^1\) The major organizational units of the Secretariat that have heads officially accountable to the Secretary-General; other bodies subsidiary or related to the United Nations such as the United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes; and organizations participating in the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS).
- **Risk Management.** The Security Risk Management (SRM) process is a comprehensive methodology to prepare a Security Risk Assessment (SRA), and will be used to determine appropriate mitigation measures for estate safety and security, and

- **UN Estate Planning Security and Safety.** Estate planning, like any United Nations activity or operation must consider safety and security factors, and must be included in the earliest stage of planning. All options for acquisition should satisfy long term needs and should embrace all type of estates.

6. The promotion of a ‘culture of security consciousnesses’ must be incorporated into the Estate Safety and Security Policy. An enhanced and proactive balance between programme delivery and safety and security must be achieved throughout the entire United Nations System.

**B. Key Terminology**

7. For purposes of this policy, estate, estate premises or premises means all categories of land, premises and physical areas that are utilized or occupied by the organizations of the United Nations System, including structures such as buildings, offices, warehouses, stores, shops, dwellings, containers, prefabs and tents.

**C. Purpose**

8. The ‘United Nations Policy on Estate Safety and Security’ sets forth the basic principles and requirements for cost-effectiveness, efficient and effective protection against known threats, based on an SRA, that may cause harm, to United Nations personnel, premises and assets worldwide.

**D. Target Audience**

9. The Estate Safety and Security Policy is primarily intended for all categories of security personnel, managers and others with responsibility for safety and security, as well as Executive Heads and senior officials of the UNSMS, legal, procurement and building management officials, host government officials, and external contractors, including technical experts.

**E. Estate Safety and Security Policy**

10. The Estate Safety and Security Policy is applicable to all United Nations estate worldwide.

11. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG DSS) is responsible for overseeing the development of this policy and coordinates its implementation with organizations of the United Nations System.

12. The Designated Official (DO), in consultation with the Security Management Team (SMT), is accountable for ensuring that an SRA is prepared and implementation of mitigation
measures for the United Nations premises in their respective duty stations/missions. Mitigation measures will respond to the risk identified.

13. All mitigation measures must be approved by the DO, in consultation with the SMT, and implemented within an agreed timeframe according to their priority, and adequate funding must be provided. The UNSMS cost-sharing mechanism should be applied to the estate policy, as appropriate. Notwithstanding this, Agencies, Funds, Programmes and Organizations may implement additional mitigation measures to their respective estate as they determine appropriate.

14. The ‘Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System’ includes estate and describes the responsibilities of each actor in the UNSMS. The Estate Safety and Security Policy is part of the comprehensive and multi-faceted approach to strengthening the UNSMS.

15. The Designated Officials shall establish and maintain contact with both national and local security authorities, to secure the best possible protection for UN personnel, their property, and the premises and assets of the organizations of the United Nations System. Host Country Agreements between UN entities and Host Governments should also be complemented by standard agreements confirming the responsibility of Host Governments.

16. Based on the SRA, special attention must be given to those locations classified as ‘Most Vulnerable’ as periodically reported by USG DSS to the Secretary-General and shared with Executive Heads of Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFP) and other organizations of the UNSMS.

17. The evaluation of estate premises must take into full account area-specific requirements, conditions and considerations, such as, but not limited to those shown below.

   a. Programme scope and objectives;
   b. Local level considerations;
   c. Access to local infrastructure;
   d. Site and perimeter security;
   e. Premises and other immovable assets security;
   f. Structural, building and interior architecture security;
   g. Mechanical, electrical and fire protection security;
   h. Facilities for, and storage of, movable assets security; and
   i. Parking security.

18. Based on the outcome of the SRM process and prevailing conditions, a recommendation will be made by the DO, in consultation with SMT, as to whether a common premise, single-agency premises or a more diverse United Nations estate approach is appropriate to respond to the particular threats and risks to the United Nations.
19. Security professionals, while evaluating the safety and security of estate, should, when necessary, consult and/or engage necessary technical expertise\(^2\).

20. All UN estate must comply with the current MOSS policy, and may be further enhanced according to the specific risks determined by the SRA.

21. The concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED\(^3\)) must be considered not only in the planning of new estate, but also for existing estate in the context of mitigation measures, wherever found operationally practicable and feasible.

F. Additional Considerations

22. Existing Inter-Agency fora, such as the Inter-Agency Network for Facilities Managers, the UNDG TTCP and at the country level, Operations Management Teams should network and integrate efforts of all UN estate stakeholders. DSS and AFP Security Focal Points have to participate to allow proper mainstreaming of safety and security in United Nations estate decisions.

23. Appropriate training for estate security planning and operation must be developed and provided by DSS and other appropriate organizations to all relevant United Nations personnel.

24. The implementation of the Estate Safety and Security Policy will be monitored and supported by the DSS compliance, evaluation and monitoring processes.

25. To ensure greater transparency, the USG DSS will annually report to the Secretary-General and the Chief Executives Board on the implementation of the Estate Safety and Security Policy.

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\(^2\) Technical experts, if not available ‘in-house’ may include, but are not limited to qualified, architects and design consultants, construction and blast engineers, counter-terrorism experts and law enforcement personnel, safety and security specialists, and building management officials.

\(^3\) CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) provides the concept of designing security into architecture. Good security enhances the effective use of the space and at the same time prevents crime. The emphasis in CPTED falls on the design and use of space, a practice that deviates from the traditional target-hardening approach to crime prevention. Often, natural and normal uses of the environment can avoid the negative image associated with ‘fortressing’ while still accomplishing the effects of mechanical hardening and surveillance and, in turn, may improve the image or the perception of the Organization from a local custom and traditions viewpoint.