Arrangements for the protection of personnel and property
(1) Following events in the Middle East in 1967, the CCAQ secretariat prepared, at the request of CCAQ, a report based on organizations' views on the subject of emergency evacuation of staff and dependants (see CO-ORDINATION/CC.29/R.13 and R.13/Add.1). CCAQ intended to discuss the subject at its 31st session (March 1970: CO-ORDINATION/R.798, para. 41), but then learnt that an agreement on the question had been reached between the United Nations and the field representatives of agencies. Certain provisions of this agreement, insofar as they could be made public, were to be incorporated in the UN and UNDP Field Manuals. It was agreed that drafts of these Manual amendments would be circulated to agency administrations. CCAQ felt that in these circumstances it would be preferable to deal with the matter by correspondence, when the drafts were available. It understood that the agreement took account of views of organizations as expressed in document CO-ORDINATION/CC.29/R.13.
(2) At its 35th session (March 1972: CO-ORDINATION/R.931, paras. 37 and 39), CCAQ noted a revised draft inter-organization agreement on arrangements for the protection of United Nations personnel and property, prepared by a working group of CCAQ during the session. It requested the CCAQ secretariat to circulate the revised draft for organizations' comments, on the basis of which the final text could be approved either by correspondence or at the next session of CCAQ. CCAQ noted also that in accordance with an agreement reached by a working party in October 1971, the UN had notified organizations of revised amounts of monthly allowances payable in respect of emergency evacuations. These were approximately 25 per cent higher than the former amounts of the allowances.
(3) In consequence of certain legal difficulties arising from the text agreed in 1971, a revised text was adopted at the 37th session of CCAQ (March 1973: CO-ORDINATION/R.984, para. 46) and issued as CO-ORDINATION/R.984/Add.2.
(4) Also at the 37th session (CO-ORDINATION/R.984, paras. 47-48) CCAQ agreed that compensation for loss of personal property under Article 26 of the Arrangements should be limited to the depreciated value of reasonable quantities of objects listed in the inventories referred to in paragraph 15(c), and payable only where insurance against the specific risks involved would not normally have been obtained by a person exercising reasonable care. Compensation should also be payable for reasonable quantities of expendables and other assets not suitable for listing in an inventory. ILO reserved its position on the insurance proviso and ICAO had no legislative authority to pay such compensation as a matter of the staff members' right. Compensation under Article 26 might also be paid for rents forfeited in respect of periods during which the evacuee was not in receipt of an allowance under Article 25, and for the cost of security guards required for the protection of staff members' homes during emergency situations.
(5) CCAQ noted at the 37th session (CO-ORDINATION/R.984, para. 49) that in most organizations, evacuated and other staff who, because of the incidents giving rise to evacuation had no effective work to do were carried in "special leave with pay" status. CCAQ felt that no fixed period could be determined in advance for the duration of that status, which should as a general rule continue as long as the likelihood remained that the staff member's services would subsequently be needed. As soon however as it became apparent that the staff member's services in the office or on the project would no longer be needed, he should be reassigned or his appointment should be terminated or allowed to expire, whichever was more economical.
(6) At its 41st session (CO-ORDINATION/R.1087, para. 70) CCAQ approved increased rates for allowances to families evacuated to the home country during emergencies at the duty station. It considered, but deferred for further study, an FAO proposal to pay 60% of the normal daily subsistence allowance in such cases.
(7) At its Special Session No. 1 (January 1976: CO-ORDINATION/R.1133, para.7) CCAQ agreed that as from 1 January 1976 subsistence allowances for families evacuated from emergency areas should be established as a direct function of the daily travel subsistence allowance, and in the amount of 25 per cent of such allowance for the first dependant and 12 1/2 per cent for each additional dependant, but subject to a limit of 3 dependants. The allowance would, as in the past, be payable for a maximum period of 6 months.
(8) At its 43rd session (March 1976: CO-ORDINATION/R.1145, para. 26) CCAQ approved a new paragraph 18 to the "Arrangements for the Protection of Personnel and Property of the family of Organizations of the UN".
(9) At its 44th session (June-July 1976: CO-ORDINATION/R.1168, paras. 49 and 50 and annex III) CCAQ agreed to amendments submitted by the UN to the existing text of the "Arrangements" (see preceding item).
(10) At its 51st session (August 1979: ACC/1979/R.55, paras. 45-47) CCAQ agreed on an amendment to paragraph 21 of the "Arrangements" to deal with cases where staff members refused an order to evacuate given by the designated authority.
(11) At its 52nd session (Part I; January 1980: ACC/1980/4, para. 56) CCAQ agreed on a certain number of procedures related to the evacuation of field staff in emergency situations.
(12) At its 53rd session (July 1980: ACC/1980/17, paras. 55-60) agreed that amendments made to the "Arrangements" since they had last been published in 1977 should be consolidated in a new text. It also agreed that the question of allowances payable to staff members and their families in emergency situations should be reviewed at the following session.
(13) At its 54th session (March 1981: ACC/1981/7, paras. 76-77) CCAQ agreed on a number of revisions to the "Arrangements", including allowances during evacuation. A consolidated text of the arrangements was issued as ACC/1980/PER/CM/21/Rev.2 dated 7 September 1981. CCAQ also agreed that the question of a reserve fund for hiatus financing of staff evacuated from their duty station pending reassignment should be explored by UNDP and CCAQ(FB).
(14) At its 55th session (July 1981: ACC/1981/31, paras. 93-96) CCAQ reverted to the question of staff members who refused to obey an order to have their dependants evacuate a duty station separately from the staff member. It was agreed to include in the "Arrangements" a new provision which in essence would require the staff member to sign a waiver relieving the organization of further responsibility for the evacuation of dependants on a priority basis and for further protection.
(15) At its 57th session (July 1982: ACC/1982/23, paras. 117-118) CCAQ agreed on new amounts of compensation for loss of or damage to personal property in emergency situations. At its 58th session (March 1983: ACC/1983/9, paras. 73-77) CCAQ agreed on amounts of compensation for specific items lost or damaged as a result of official duties in non-emergency situations. It also agreed on the method of calculating the value of the article to be replaced: replacement value less a depreciation factor calculated on the age of the article.
(16) At the same session (58th) CCAQ agreed that damage to living accommodation could be taken into account for compensation purposes in emergency situations whenever the staff member was responsible by law for repairs for such damage.
(17) At its 61st session (June-July 1984: ACC/1984/16, para. 116 and Annex VII), CCAQ agreed on a revised schedule of evacuation allowances, effective 1 August 1984.
(18) A working group met during the Committee's 62nd session (March 1985) to consider a common approach to the administration of the monthly evacuation allowance (MEA) in respect of dependants of UN staff assigned to Lebanon. The Committee endorsed (ACC/1986/6, para. 155) the report of the working group (ibid., Annex VI), noting that at the present stage the UN did not intend to apply the measures envisaged to staff serving with UNIFIL in Naquora.
(19) At its 63rd session (July 1985), CCAQ proposed to ICSC exceptional financial arrangements for staff serving in Lebanon (ACC/1985/14, paras. 99-101). The Commission approved these arrangements, at its 22nd session (July 1985), with effect from 1 July 1985 (A/40/30, para. 200).
(20) At its 65th session (July 1986: ACC/1986/10, paras. 71-73), CCAQ approved arrangements for expediting the reimbursement of residential security costs at field duty stations.
(21) At its 66th session (March 1987), CCAQ proposed to ICSC revised exceptional financial arrangements for staff serving in Beirut (ACC/1987/4, paras. 63-65). The Commission approved these arrangements at its 25th session, with effect from 1 April 1987. (See also section 10.2(14).)
(22) At its 68th session (March 1988: ACC/1988/4, paras. 121-130) CCAQ considered several recommendations of the third Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security (July 1987), referred to it by ACC (decision 1987/20). It endorsed a recommendation that reimbursement for the construction of safe havens within the residence (e.g. reinforced doors on an internal room) should be within the current limits for window bars (i.e. $400); it agreed that when an organization "invited" staff members and dependants to leave a duty station where a formal state of evacuation had not been declared, it should make appropriate arrangements for their travel, and there should be provision for some form of evacuation allowances; and, while agreeing not to revise the arrangements for monthly evacuation allowance (MEA) made for the Lebanon, it reminded organizations of the need to reassign staff who were in evacuation status for long periods.
(23) Following proposals by FICSA, CCAQ at its 68th session (ACC/1988/4, paras. 131-133) considered improved compensation for loss of or damage to personal effects and private vehicles, in both emergency and non-emergency situations. At its 69th session, on the basis of investigation by the secretariat, it reached a series of conclusions. It agreed (with UNESCO reserving its position) that the existing differentiation between emergency and non-emergency cases should be abolished, on the understanding that within the compensation maxima organizations should be free to apply their internal rules, and with effect from 1 September 1988 it adjusted the individual maxima (annex VI to ACC/1988/12), though - except in the case of an automobile - organizations need not apply them (ibid., paras. 82-86).
(24) At both its 68th and 69th sessions (March and July 1988) CCAQ discussed insurance of staff required to work at dangerous duty stations (ACC/1988/4, paras. 127-129; ACC/1988/12, paras. 80, 81) but in neither case did it consider it had sufficient information at its disposal. At its 70th session (March 1989: ACC/1989/6, paras. 52-55) it reviewed some quotations for "danger zone" insurance coverage, without coming to any agreement about a common arrangement (see also para. (28)).
(25) At both its first special (1989) session (January: ACC/1989/2, paras. 21-23) and its 70th session (ACC/1989/6, paras. 56-59) CCAQ(PER) discussed a proposal from the UN Security Co-ordinator to fund two posts on an inter-agency basis to provide support for field security. Following the expression of reservations by some organizations UN raised the proposal in ACC itself. In the meantime CCAQ(FB) had discussed the proposal but was unable to support it (ACC/1989/7, paras. 21-23). ACC agreed to the new posts (decision 1989/14; see also section 16.6 for arrangements for funding the posts).
(26) In the light of a deteriorating security situation in Beirut and the resulting escalation in prices, CCAQ at its 71st session (July-August 1989: ACC/1989/14, para. 132) agreed that the UN Security Co-ordinator should be asked to request the Chairman of ICSC to adjust the exceptional arrangements applicable in that city, for a conditional period of three months from 1 August 1989, as follows:
- Professional staff: increase in exceptional financial incentive from $1,100 to $1,400 per month;
- Locally-recruited staff: increase in bonus from 30 per cent to 40 per cent of net base salary.
The above arrangements were periodically extended until 30 June 1990, when Beirut was reclassified as a category E duty station.
(27) For a 1990 decision of CCAQ on the period during which DSA should be paid in cases of medical evacuation, see section 4.3.
(28) At its 72nd session (February-March 1990: ACC/1990/4, paras. 155-157, 162, 163) CCAQ took note of a war-risk insurance scheme introduced in participating organizations, with effect from 1 January 1990, in designated countries (see also section 16.6). It also noted that a revised text of the Security Handbook would soon be circulated. A discussion of hazard pay led to the submission of proposals by UN and UNDP at the Committee's 73rd session (July 1990) for a more structured approach to that entitlement. They included criteria for designating duty stations and fixing the duration of hazard payments, a system for determining degrees of hazard, the establishment of hazard pay levels, and procedures for approving, extending and terminating hazard pay. The Committee recommended them to ICSC (see ACC/1990/10, paras. 79, 80 and annex IV; see also ACC/1991/5, paras. 85-91). At its 75th session (July-August 1991: ACC/1991/17, paras. 164-166) the Committee settled some administrative issues involving entitlements to hazard pay.
(29) A revised text of annex M of the Security Handbook, covering the schedule of remuneration following evacuation and effective 1 July 1990, was issued as ACC/1990/PER/CM/23 of 5 December 1990. It replaced the text in ACC/1984/PER/CM/12 of 26 July 1984.
(30) At its 74th session (March 1991: ACC/1991/5, paras. 92-105 and annex IV) CCAQ reviewed a proposed revision to the current text of annex M of the Security Handbook, and a proposed introductory text. It also agreed to a number of amendments and clarifications relevant to the remuneration and other entitlements of personnel following evacuation.
(31) At the same session (ibid., para. 106) the Committee agreed that the special arrangements for payment of MEA in the Lebanon, introduced in 1985, should be phased out by the end of 1991 if the situation there continued to improve.
(32) Also at its 74th session (ibid., paras. 69-84 and annex III) CCAQ agreed to revised limits for compensation payments for loss of or damage to personal effects, effective 1 April 1991. The new limits would apply in both emergency and non-emergency cases.
(33) At its following (75th) session (July-August 1991: ACC/1991/17, paras. 116 and 120-122), in line with a recommendation by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security (June 1991), the Committee agreed to increase the overall limits to $40,000 (dependent rate) and $30,000 (single rate), effective 1 September 1991. At the same session (75th) the Committee asked its secretariat to pursue actively the possibility of establishing a system-wide group property insurance policy.
(34) At the same session (ibid., paras. 117-119) CCAQ also approved increases of 100 per cent in the limits for partial reimbursement of protective devices at residences of staff members, as well as a more flexible approach to other protective measures, effective 1 September 1991. The measures had been recommended by the June 1991 Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security. At the same session the Committee endorsed a conclusion of the ad hoc meeting that evacuation allowances should be payable to Professional staff serving in their own country at the time that an evacuation was authorized from that country (ibid., para. 123; see also ACC/1991/5, para. 104). It also concurred in a conclusion of the meeting that under the security arrangements all necessary action should continue to be taken for the protection of local staff placed in life-threatening situations (ibid., para. 124).
(35) A revised version of the Security Handbook was finalized in 1991 and approved by the Organizational Committee on behalf of ACC. It included revisions to annex I (formerly annex M) reflecting changes arising from the ad hoc meeting referred to in (33) and (34) above and affecting evacuation allowances applicable as of Security Phase III and beyond (ACC/1991/17, paras. 125-136; see also ACC/1991/5, para. 104). The new text, effective 1 October 1991, was issued as ACC/1991/PER/CM/18 of 18 October. CCAQ at its 75th session (July-August 1991) approved arrangements for evacuation allowances affecting staff serving in "non-family" duty stations (ACC/1991/17, paras. 127-134).
(36) At its 76th session (March 1992: ACC/1992/6, paras. 118-119) CCAQ decided to bring to the attention of ICSC that, since evacuation allowances were base on rental thresholds, it was not possible to set the level for evacuation allowances where no rental threshold had been established and to urge ICSC to establish post adjustment levels for such countries or agree on a percentage representing the weight attributable to housing. Pending the establishment of the necessary indices organizations would agree on a pragmatic approach, in consultation with the CCAQ secretariat. At the next session it was decided to base the threshold on an interim rate of 15 per cent (ACC/1992/23, paras. 111-112).
(37) Also at the 76th session the Committee requested its secretary to pursue his enquiries into some form of insurance to cover the rising number of claims from the loss of staff members effects in cases of emergency evacuation, instead of relying on the organizations' budgets (ACC/1992/6, paras. 124-125).
(38) At its 77th session (July 1992: ACC/1992/23, paras. 94-95) CCAQ was given additional information regarding an all risks insurance policy and asked its secretariat to collect data from organizations on past claims for further discussions with a broker. (See Section 3.1, para. 23, for a discussion of service credits for home and annual leave during evacuation).
(39) At the same session the Committee considered a report of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security Matters (May 1994) and, recognizing the close relationship between security and compensation, endorsed its request to CCAQ to explore the possibility of developing a common approach to entitlements for staff serving in high risk duty stations. The meeting also forwarded, directly to ACC, two recommendations concerning the question of local staff in situations of evacuation and the use of armed guards. In view of their financial consequences and of CCAQ's past role in the development of the field security handbook, the Committee considered that it should review these recommendations as a matter of urgency before their consideration by ACC and requested UNDP to convene a working group with participation by all interested organizations (ibid., paras. 180-182).
(40) At the second part of its 83rd session (September 1995: ACC/1995/19, paras. 95-102) CCAQ considered the security of locally recruited staff in situations of serious insecurity and emphasized that all staff were covered under the security umbrella of the United Nations at all times. CCAQ decided to endorse a number of courses of action and to give them widespread publicity in an operations manual. The Committee further suggested that the Office of the UN Security Coordinator establish a list of "early warning" countries where action should be the most energetic in ensuring that such measures were in place and made a number of other recommendations for practical arrangements. It also agreed that organizations should give consideration in such circumstances to allowing locally recruited staff contracts to run for at least six months following the date of declaration of security phases III to IV, irrespective of their expiry date, in situations where the contracts could normally have been expected to be extended, unless specifically barred under the terms of the contract.
(41) At its 91st session (July 1999: ACC/1999/13, para. 15) CCAQ reviewed issues arising out of the May 1999 Ad Hoc Meeting on Security in Washington, DC, and expressed its appreciation to the Deputy Security Coordinator, UNSECOORD, for her briefing on the incidences of staff endangered whilst on duty in the past year and on the outcome of the Ad Hoc meeting. The Committee underlined the importance of strengthening security training and counselling arrangements at all duty stations and in particular at high risk duty stations. In this connection, CCAQ requested organizations' representatives to contact their country representatives to remind them of the importance of participating in, and of ensuring that all their staff also participated in, security training activities in country. The Committee also took note with appreciation of the willingness of UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF to assist the Security Coordinator in the redrafting of Annex I of the Security Handbook (evacuation entitlements). The revised draft would be circulated as soon as possible to CCAQ members for clearance by correspondence; it would then be included in the revised Security Handbook which was under preparation by the Security Coordinator's Office for presentation to ACC later in 1999.
(42) CCAQ also requested that, in order for organizations to move with all urgency towards the reimbursement of residential security measures on the basis of a flat rate lump sum, a contact group develop a simplified matrix to be cleared with organizations by correspondence. The secretariat was also requested to follow up with the UN Office in Nairobi (UNON) to see whether UNON intended to move forward on an interim basis on this matter.
(43) CCAQ also took note of the conclusions reached at the Ad Hoc meeting on security on the security implications of the Y2K problem for United Nations staff (ibid., annex III) and reviewed in detail organizations' arrangements to meet potential security and other related problems that might occur in connection with the Y2K. In this connection, it recalled the conclusions reached at the High Level CCAQ meeting in March 1999 (ibid., annex IV). It requested all organizations to continue to pursue discussions, duty station by duty station, on all matters related to potential Y2K difficulties and in particular to look at more flexible leave arrangements, salary advances, local banking conditions and other matters that might have an impact on the management of human resources at each duty station. It also welcomed the offer of the Security Coordinator's Office to circulate data on an on-going basis about potential risks associated with the Y2K.
(44) Finally the Committee took note of the conclusions reached at the Ad Hoc meeting on security in respect of the criteria under which field security officer positions would no longer be required. In this connection, it also recalled the arrangements that were already in place for the selection and the management of performance of field security officers by the security management teams in each country. It requested organizations, where appropriate, to bring these arrangements again to the attention of country representatives. It further confirmed that positions of field security officers should not be filled by nationals of the country in question.
(45) At its first meeting (June 2001: ACC/2001/HLCM/7, para. 34) the Human Resources (HR) Network was briefed by the Deputy Security Coordinator, UNSECOORD on the conclusions and recommendations of the May 2001 Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security. Noting that the HLCM would consider the report of the Ad Hoc meeting along with new funding arrangements for security operations, the Network focussed on those areas of particular relevance to the management of human resources. Specifically, the Network agreed in principle to the proposal to streamline and simplify the approach to evacuation entitlements as follows:
(a) For the staff member, $160/day for up to 30 days. Thereafter $120/day (from the second month through the sixth month);
(b) For family members residing at the duty station, $80/day, for up to 30 days. Thereafter $60/day (from the second through sixth month);
(c) If the staff member returned to the duty station and the family was unable to return or if the staff member was sent on a temporary assignment (and received there the relevant DSA), then the first family member would be paid at the higher rate of DSA ($160 or $120, as appropriate);
(d) Normal entitlements of the regular duty station would continue to apply while the staff member was on evacuation (with the organizations making common sense adjustments as appropriate, depending on the pay status that the staff member might have had at the duty station, e.g. mission status, DSA in lieu of post adjustment);
(e) Additionally, for the purposes of facilitating a small shipment of personal effects from the duty station (and incidentals including "terminal expenses"), a lump sum of $500 would be provided to the staff member at the time of evacuation. The Network requested organizations to implement these revised allowances once approved by the HLCM so as to ensure that all staff in the field were treated in an equitable manner.
(46) The Network noted the preliminary discussions in respect of accountability and the need to identify and implement accountability standards for security management, endorsed the approach put forward by the Ad Hoc Meeting on Security and confirmed that this approach should be pursued on an urgent basis. It invited the secretariats of UNSECOORD and ACC to bring together a task force of HR and security specialists as soon as possible in order to develop accountability standards for presentation to HLCM. It also noted the close link between the discussions that had taken place at the Ad Hoc meetings on security and on social policies with regard to assistance to families and decided that the discussions of the security meeting should be considered in the context of the decisions made on social policies. It further endorsed the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Meeting that all field security personnel should be provided with sensitivity training to assist them in responding to issues involving staff members, their families or both.
(47) At its September 2001 session (ACC/2001/12, paras. 5-6) HLCM took note with appreciation of proposals put forward by UNHCR, on behalf also of UNDP, UNICEF and WFP, in respect of developing a robust governance system for security management across the United Nations system. It acknowledged that, whilst preserving a clear line of command, security management arrangements should reflect the users' concerns and needs. It requested a Task Force led by UNHCR, together with UN, UNICEF and WHO, to review as soon as possible these and any other relevant proposals and to prepare a document with recommendations for consultative mechanisms and structural relationships, including the linkages with local security arrangements, which would further enhance the security management system. It agreed to consider the report of this Task Force by video conference or other suitable means at the latest by the end of year 2001.
(48) At the same session (ibid., para. 7) the Committee endorsed for immediate implementation by all organizations a simplified system of evacuation allowances, noting that this served to further overall efforts to streamline employee benefits.
(49) At its March 2002 session (CEB/2002/3, paras. 14-17) HLCM was provided with a progress report by the Deputy Security Coordinator, UNSECOORD, in which it was confirmed that agencies were working more closely together on security matters than ever before. The Committee also noted that the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the security and safety of UN personnel was proceeding smoothly. At Headquarters the recruitment of additional staff was under way and expected to be completed by June 2002. In the field, as at 1 March 2002, 70 field security officers were in place and candidates for another 30 positions were being interviewed. A Memorandum of Understanding had been signed with UNDP which would undertake the recruitment and administration of the Field Security Officers (FSOs) on behalf of the UN system. The Committee also noted that the issue of air safety was becoming a matter of serious concern. There were two components:
(a) situations where the UN system chartered aircraft and
(b) the use of commercial aircraft by organizations.
In these cases approaches based on cost considerations alone, without reference to quality, were no longer viable options. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network would be considering proposals to establish common Minimum Air Safety and Security Standards and the related issue of the number of the members of UN system staff (30) who could fly on one aircraft within the framework of the current malicious acts insurance policy. The Committee took note of the willingness of ICAO to participate in providing assistance. The Committee welcomed the progress made and looked forward to receiving recommendations from the Inter-Agency Security Management Network to be forwarded to CEB and the UN General Assembly as required.
(50) Significant progress was also reported in respect of training to enhance the security awareness and preparedness of staff. In addition to the training programmes themselves, an interactive CD-ROM had been developed for use by all UN organizations. The essential message was that security was a shared responsibility. The importance of providing such training – and exposure to the CD-ROM – to staff in Headquarters and other non-field locations was emphasized most forcefully. Security was no longer exclusively a "field issue" and senior managers everywhere had to take full responsibility for their role in the management of staff security.
(51) At its July 2002 meeting (CEB/2002/HLCM/14, para. 14) the HR Network was briefed by representatives of UNSECOORD on the status of the overall security management system and the conclusions and recommendations of the May 2002 Ad hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security, in particular with respect to recommendations set out in a document (CEB/2002/HLCM/12) on new residential security measures and procedures, which would be incorporated into the revised Field Security Handbook. Reiterating the position that the security and safety of staff must not be compromised, the Network
(a) welcomed the new approach to residential security which was more in line with what was actually happening at the field level;
(b) agreed in principle that organizations should assume responsibility for bearing the entire cost of the determined minimum residential security measures of internationally recruited staff subject to consideration of the financial implications;
(c) looked forward to receiving from UNSECOORD a cost estimate so that financial implications could be evaluated and a final decision taken by correspondence before the end of the year;
(d) noted that the majority of organizations were not in favour of a lump sum approach in this area, particularly at the start up of the new arrangements and also in view of the organizations' liability as employers, but recognized that if additional information were made available, the case might be made for a lump sum approach based on an assessment of the local situation;
(e) requested that the situation of female spouses be included along with female staff in the threat/risk assessment and determination of Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORS) at duty stations;
(f) deferred consideration of extending some elements of the residential security measures to locally-recruited staff since this would entail a significant change in policy and have significant financial implications. The Network preferred to await operational experience with the new measures before contemplating their extension.
(52) At its October 2002 session (CEB/2002/5, paras. 21-22) HLCM received a briefing from the UN Office of the Security Coordinator. Its attention was drawn, in particular, to the conclusions of the May 2002 Meeting of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. HLCM confirmed its commitment to the implementation of Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) at all duty stations and commended those organizations taking an active role in facilitating the implementation of MOSS. It requested all organizations to bring to the attention of senior managers that MOSS must be implemented and to encourage their field staff to take ownership of MOSS. It recommended that all organizations with a field presence identify a MOSS focal point to liaise with UNSECOORD and to participate in MOSS working groups and requested UNSECOORD to provide an update on the status of implementation of MOSS at the next HLCM meeting. HLCM also decided to invite organizations with all urgency to forward a statement calling on all organizations to advise representatives in all field duty stations falling under any of the five security phases of their responsibilities with respect to the implementation of all aspects of security policy, in particular the implementation and maintenance of security plan and MOSS for compliance with both and for ensuring that all personnel had adequate and operating communication equipment as established by these minimum standards.
(53) At the same session (ibid., para. 23) HLCM, in discussing aviation safety and security standards, agreed that UN chartered flight operations should be divided into two distinct categories: peace-keeping and humanitarian or other. It requested WFP to consider taking on the role as the agency responsible for administering all UN humanitarian and other air operations (excluding peace-keeping) and requested WFP also to consider establishing a suitable independent Air Safety unit to ensure both the efficiency and safety of UN humanitarian and other air operations (subject to reservation by UNHCR). HLCM welcomed UNHCR's offer to join WFP and DPKO in the Air Safety Working Group and noted that progress had been made with regard to identifying the safety records of commercial air carriers. It expressed appreciation for ICAO's offer of collaboration. HLCM also called on those agencies which continued to demand that staff sign a waiver limiting the liability of the organization in the event of an air or other accident, to discontinue the practice.
(54) At its March 2003 meeting (CEB/2003/HLCM/12, para. 20) the HR Network recalled that at its second session in 2002 it had inter alia (a) agreed in principle that organizations should assume responsibility for bearing the entire cost of the determined minimum residential security measures for internationally recruited staff and (b) requested UNSECOORD to provide additional information regarding the approximate cost of these measures. It noted that, in response to a request of UNSECOORD to all designated officials, a total of 90 duty stations had replied regarding costs associated with guards, alarms, bars and safe havens. In view of the financial considerations, it agreed to recommend to HLCM that it endorse the recommendations of the working group on Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORS) which would form a distinct yet integral part of the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) for a duty station, as laid out in the Report of the Working Group of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network.
(55) At its June 2003 session (CEB/2003/3, paras. 8-13) the United Nations Security Coordinator provided HLCM with details of the May 2003 meeting of the Inter-Agency Security Management (IASM) Network. He noted that while there had been considerable progress made over the past year to mainstream staff security and to make it an integral part of all operations, there continued to be an increase in conflict situations, general insecurity and criminal activities, which affected staff and hampered UN system operations. He confirmed that:
(a) over the past year over 95 per cent of the recommendations made by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly in 2001 had been implemented or were in the process of being implemented. The 100 Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) posts had been filled and each officer had been provided with a dedicated budget to permit him/her to operate effectively in the field. This new system meant that the Security Coordinator's Office was able to react quickly by shifting FSCOs from one duty station to another to respond to crisis situations;
(b) at UNSECOORD Headquarters, recruitment was almost complete. Only two posts remained to be filled. This meant that UNSECOORD would be in a better position to implement its mandate effectively;
(c) the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) were being put in place at all duty stations. Although this was not moving as fast as all would like, there was nevertheless tangible progress to report;
(d) another initiative that had been extremely well received was the CD-ROM on basic security in the field, which the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Security Coordinator had launched at the April meeting of the Chief Executives Board. The CD-ROM was but one of a number of training initiatives critical to the enhancement of preventive measures for staff security;
(e) the framework for accountability that was now in place had been cited by member states as an example of excellence. Inspection and compliance missions had commenced;
(f) the UNSECOORD website was up and running, making it easier to convey information to the largest number of people in the shortest period of time;
(g) the evidence that these new measures were having an impact was evident in the analysis of fatalities amongst staff members of the UN system. The annual number of staff members who had lost their lives in the service of the organization was the lowest since 1992;
(h) nevertheless, the IASM Network considered that much still remained to be done. This was also the view of Member States. Over the past two years, two General Assembly resolutions regarding security of staff had requested that the Secretary-General consider further modifications to the UN security management system. The first resolution requested that the Secretary-General conduct an evaluation of the UN security management system, including the new security arrangements, and the relationship and interaction between the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations and UNSECOORD. The second resolution requested the UN system to take all appropriate measures to achieve a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, both at headquarters and at the field level. To respond to these requests an evaluation team had been constituted and was travelling to a number of duty stations to review the existing situation and to submit a report to a steering group headed by the Deputy Secretary-General.
(56) The representative of WFP confirmed WFP's agreement to be responsible for administering all humanitarian air operations (excluding peacekeeping) with effect from 1 January 2004. The WFP air safety service also had the benefit of technical advice from ICAO. UNHCR assured WFP of its willingness to work with it on the implementation of air safety issues. Updates were also given to the Committee on the 2003 census arrangements and the proposal to reimburse 100% of the cost of residential security measures. HLCM welcomed the report from the Security Coordinator and noted that under his effective leadership a strong, well-qualified security management team had been put in place and took note of the information contained in the report of the IASM Network, in particular in respect of the implementation of MOSS. HLCM was informed that as a result of filling the posts of Field Security Officers (FSOs) in an effective and timely manner there was a shortfall of some $12 million in the budget for 2002-2003 and, in the context of preparing budgets in a timely fashion, took note also of the financial projections of staff security costs from the UN Budget Division for future biennia of some $87 million for 2004-2005, and on the basis of an inflationary increase of $7 million, of $94 million for 2006-2007. It approved the recommendation of the IASM and HR Networks to reimburse the cost of residential security measures as part of the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORS) at 100% and confirmed the central role of UNSECOORD in determining the levels of such reimbursements. It noted with appreciation the arrangements for the 2003 census and the need for further refinement of some definitions. HLCM expressed its appreciation to WFP for agreeing to take responsibility for administering aviation operations for the system as a whole (except for peacekeeping) and for establishing an air safety unit. It looked forward to receiving in due course a further report on the safe use of commercial air carriers. Finally it underlined the crucial importance it attached to continuing to strengthen stress counselling arrangements in organizations of the system and of looking into improving arrangements for the safety of women, especially in dangerous field locations.
(57) At its 6th Session (October 2003: CEB/2003/5, paras. 8-10) HLCM briefed by the United Nations Security Coordinator on experience gained after the tragic events in Baghdad. It also received reports emanating from two meetings of the working group of the IASM Network. Arising out of these reports were a series of recommendations on (a) risk and threat assessment, (b) United Nations premises, accommodations and movement control, (c) technical security matters, (d) security at headquarters locations, (e) accountability, (f) security for women, (g) air safety and (h) a guard contingent.
(58) In an extensive discussion of the issues raised in the recommendations, members re-emphasized the importance they attached to strengthening UN system security arrangements. The Committee then welcomed the recommendations in this critical area, endorsed the policy thrust contained therein, urged implementation of those actions that could be undertaken immediately within existing resources and requested UNSECOORD to provide, as a matter of urgency, details of financial implications arising out of the recommendations, the cost of which were to be shared among organizations.
(59) While acknowledging the importance of strengthening UN system security arrangements, FAO underscored the need for a detailed financial analysis of the proposals to be considered by the IASMN, in the light of their potentially significant budgetary implications. Such analysis and the recommendations of the Network based thereon would allow HLCM and subsequently CEB to review comprehensively, and make an informed decision on, the feasibility of implementing the proposed security measures. In this regard, FAO took note of, and fully supported, the request made by HLCM to UNSECOORD for the urgent provision of details on the financial implications.
(60) At its 7th session (March 2004: CEB/2004/3, paras. 8-13) HLCM was informed that the fifth annual meeting of the UN Security and Safety Services Network had been held the previous week at Interpol headquarters in Lyon, France. The key agenda item was the presentation of the Headquarters Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), established by the secretariat entities in December 2003, for United Nations system wide acceptance. In addition to defining standards for the physical security of headquarters complexes, access control, training, weaponry and so forth, MOSS also contained a new profile for security officers that would be more closely aligned with national uniformed services. Extensive consultations with various parties, such as staff representatives and the UNJSPF, would be required before the new profile of security officers could be introduced. The UN Office of HRM would take the lead. In Interpol's assessment, the UN system was among international organizations most vulnerable to terrorist attack. The participants in the Network had agreed that MOSS should be applied to all UN system headquarters locations. As the Bretton Woods institutions were not present at the last Network meeting, they would be consulted bilaterally.
(61) In a previous meeting of the Network, participants had already agreed on the format of a global UN system identity card/building pass and the basic technology for a global access control system. The new system to be implemented by the UN Secretariat would constitute a model for such a system. The system will be sufficiently flexible to accommodate legacy systems and incremental enhancements as required by individual organizations. The Network also concluded that it would be useful for the CEB to issue another policy statement on security to demonstrate commitment at the highest level to staff security. A draft policy statement would be presented to the CEB secretariat in due course.
(62) The Committee expressed concern about the definition of "headquarters" within MOSS and raised a number of issues relating to the funding required to bring organizations up to those standards. Organizations in the same location should coordinate on the matter. Experience had shown that involvement of local security authorities was a fundamental requirement, particularly in the areas of vulnerability, threat and risk assessment; some national authorities had agreed to partial funding of security improvements in UN system facilities. The need to avoid the creation of "soft" targets, whereby some organizations improved security and others did not, was of particular concern. The Network considered that a system wide acceptance of MOSS would constitute a powerful basis for additional funding to enhance security, having noted that security was not always considered a core activity and did not receive adequate funding. While MOSS set minimum standards, they also provided for alternative mitigating measures in the event of it not being possible to fully implement the established standards but this had to be documented. MOSS would be submitted to expert groups outside the United Nations for validation.
(63) The Committee noted that, in light of the many initiatives being undertaken under the auspices of the Network, it had been proposed that a permanent secretariat for the Network be established. This proposal was being studied and would in due course be presented to the Committee. Some Committee members expressed concern regarding the relationship, and possible overlap, between the work of the Network and UNSECOORD and underlined the need for more consistency and integration in the work of the two groups. The Committee (a) stated its interest in working collectively to produce basic security standards for all UN system staff and facilities, while maintaining some levels of flexibility to accommodate local conditions, with the aim of greater centralization of security management in the UN system, particularly with a view of providing clarity of where individual responsibilities lay and also requested clarification on the definition of "headquarters"; (b) noted the intention of the UN Security and Safety Service to prepare a draft security policy statement for submission to the CEB; and (c) agreed that, although security spending was a critical issue, the planned budget increases for spending by UNSECOORD could not be met from cost sharing methods and must, therefore, be a priority item in the UN budget to be put before the General Assembly.
(64) At its July 2004 meeting (CEB/2004/HLCM/25, para. 26) the HR Network expressed its appreciation to UNSECOORD and the IASM Network for its extensive work in the area of security for UN staff and noted that the full report of IASM Network would be submitted to HLCM for its review and approval. The HR Network took note of the recommendations specifically addressed to it encouraging the participation of HR specialists in the working group on the security of women. The HR Network emphasized the mandatory elements of the UN security strategy and the need for compliance with such elements, in particular that: (a) Executive Heads act as role models for the participation in and promulgation of security training; (b) travel authorizations not be granted without the staff member's completion of the relevant security training; and (c) security training be incorporated into each organization's staff appraisal process. The Network agreed that all organizations should incorporate a security component into their training programs, particularly those for orientation of new staff and management training, and further agreed on the need for a more intensive security communication mechanism and strategy, including; (i) cultural and gender sensitivity, (ii) use of a more balanced approach, i.e. country-specific recommendations, and (iii) that all materials be produced in at least the major UN languages to ensure that the message reached the maximum number of staff. It recognized that there was an urgent need to put in place policies to deal with significant security incidents, which built upon lessons learned from previous experiences (e.g. in handling the aftermath of the Baghdad bombing). It agreed that operational linkages between UNSECOORD and HR and counselling managers in individual organizations should be reinforced. The Network noted the important need for Member States to earmark an adequate proportion of budgets for the safety and security of staff.
(65) Discussions on cost sharing of expenditures on security are reported in section 16.6, paras. (76) et seq.
(66) At its 8th session (October 2004: CEB/2004/6, paras. 7-12) HLCM was provided with the draft "Report of the Secretary General on a Strengthened and Unified Security Management System for the United Nations" (A/59/365) to be funded under the UN regular budget. It was recognized that security, a prerequisite for programme delivery, was a core responsibility of Member States and should be funded centrally under the UN regular budget. The current cost shared approach was ineffective and administratively cumbersome in that it was dependant on voluntarily funded budgets of UN agencies, funds and programmes. The main recommendations with respect to the headquarters component were: (a) the amalgamation of existing security structures into a new Directorate of Security, (b) strengthened functional capabilities in the areas of security threat and risk assessment, (c) coordination of close protection, and (d) operational support to the field, including policy and standards, compliance and evaluation, training and HRM of security staff, operational guidance and overall technical supervision in other headquarters locations. Regarding the field component, the main recommendations included: (i)the senior UN official at the duty station who would be the Designated Official responsible for security of all civilian staff in the country, (ii) the Designated Official would be advised by a senior security officer, called the country security advisor, who would have operational authority over UN security officers at the duty station, including other agencies' security officers and personal protection teams and (iii) a significant increase in the number of security personnel in the field. The Committee was informed that in the proposals presented to the General Assembly's fifty eighth (resumed session), an additional $10,745,000 had been approved for security, of which $2,583,000 would automatically fall under the regular budget of the United Nations. Under current arrangements for cost sharing, the remainder of $8,162,100 would have to be cost shared; however, if the Secretary General's proposal to abolish cost sharing for security costs were to be accepted, that amount would also fall in full to the regular budget. The decision on cost sharing was deferred to the 59th General Assembly session.
(67) Noting that the proposals emanated from a number of independent reviews and investigations, the Committee: (a) welcomed the proposals, including the new organization structure and approach to financing, (b) agreed that all organizations should be proactive in seeking the support of Member States in their governing bodies or executive boards, (c) took note of further work that had to be undertaken on such issues as governance, an implementation strategy for the new security management system and strengthened coordination at all headquarters' locations, including how to maximize partnerships and collaboration with the specialized agencies, (d) noted that the new UN Security Directorate would not be responsible for security at the headquarters locations of the specialized agencies which would continue their relationships with host governments, the latter being ultimately responsible for the security and safety of personnel - the Committee believed it would be useful for organizations to share information on the initiatives of host governments in this regard - and (e) requested that both security networks, field and headquarters, submit proposals to HLCM on mechanisms that would ensure a robust, well coordinated global security management system.
(68) At the same meeting (ibid., para. 13) HLCM considered and endorsed the IASMN's report of its May 2004 meeting and approved its key recommendations related to security threat and risk assessments, minimum operating security standards, aviation safety, medical emergencies involving mass casualties, security training and accountability. [Specifically, the Committee: (a) with regard to Security Risk Management (i) endorsed the Risk Management model and recommended its immediate adoption as a tool to enable enhanced security management at the local, regional and headquarters levels, (ii) agreed that each Designated Official and Security Management Team should conduct a threat and risk assessment, and identify areas of vulnerability in order to determine the measures necessary to mitigate risk - The threat and risk assessment was an ongoing cyclical exercise, which should be maintained, reviewed and updated on a regular basis - and (iii) agreed that threat assessments, put together by a country team, should be reviewed by a dedicated unit within UNSECOORD to ensure a consistent approach;(b) with regard to MOSS: (i) endorsed the revised MOSS policy document as the new baseline standard for security at the field level - These baseline standards, combined with the outcome of the threat and risk assessment for the specific local condition should be incorporated into a location specific MOSS - and (ii) agreed that compliance evaluations of and assistance with the implementation of MOSS should be undertaken by a dedicated unit within UNSECOORD; (c) with regard to Aviation Safety (i) endorsed the main recommendations related to aviation safety, including the need to develop a common aviation safety policy, drawing on the proposed Air Safety Code of Conduct, (ii) recommended that Organizations, not having a flight safety rating procedure, utilize the Flightsafe rating system on a restricted basis until it was evaluated and determined whether it will remain the common system and (iii) affirmed that political and financial considerations should not be the overriding factors to determine whether a given airline was utilized by the UN system;(d) with regard to Coping with Mass Casualties (i) emphasized the shared responsibility of security and medical personnel in crisis management involving mass casualties, and recommended enhancing cooperation, coordination and joint training between these two areas, (ii) supported the UNMERT proposed by the Medical Directors and recommended its implementation without delay and (iii) commended the study undertaken by WFP, FAO and ICTY, and recommended that a manual, including an operational plan for dealing with mass casualties, be developed for promulgation to the field; and (e) with regard to Training (i) reiterated that security training was mandatory for all staff members depending on their individual specific needs (field or HQ based) and called on each organization to ensure adherence, (ii) agreed that staff should refresh their CD ROM security training every three years on a mandatory basis and (iii) agreed that all Designated Officials must undergo mandatory security briefing/training prior to assuming their assignment.
(69) Also at its 8th session (ibid., paras. 17-18) HLCM considered a document on Contingency Planning and Emergency Preparation, an update of a document presented at its fifth session in June 2003 on actions taken by individual organizations to improve their security and emergency preparedness so as to provide guidance for those organizations that had yet to complete their emergency preparedness and business continuity planning in the hope that experience gained by organizations might serve as a useful reference for others. The Committee (a) noted that time and resources were saved through greater information sharing and cooperation in this area and (b) agreed that the CEB secretariat should continue to survey organizations once a year on latest developments.
(70) At its 9th session (April 2005: CEB/2005/3, paras. 6-11) HLCM focused on issues relating to the new security arrangements. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security informed the Committee that the newly established Department of Safety and Security (DSS) envisioned achieving the following main goals: (a) To be the world’s most effective, professional, flexible and supportive department of safety and security; (b) To have the enhanced operational ability to enable and deliver the United Nations mission in the most demanding locations on the globe; and (c) To work with a team of men and women who were respected and envied as the gold medal standard of international safety and security achievement. He expressed his strong support for the approach of funding field-related security costs from the regular budget of the United Nations. He informed the Committee that he was engaged in a broad process of consultation with all constituencies, seeking candid and constructive cooperation so as to ensure the protection of the staff of the United Nations system. In particular, he was meeting with designated officials to resolve what he saw as an evident imbalance between what the system sought to do centrally and what could be decentralized. The Committee (a) welcomed the assumption by Mr. Veness of his new position and expressed its appreciation and support for the objectives of the new security arrangements; (b) noted two specific issues for future consideration by DSS: (i) the appointment and role of designated officials at headquarters duty stations (the role rotated in Rome but nothing existed in Geneva); and (ii) the need to look at and improve the interrelationship between DSS and the specialized agencies.
(71) At its July 2005 meeting (CEB/2005/HLCM/27, para. 19) the HR Network reviewed the report of IASMN. The attention of the Network was drawn to (a) the need for the support of the Network to ensure that all organizations’ stress counsellors were fully integrated within the security management system so as to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to critical incident stress management across the UN system; (b) the specific training in gender sensitivity required for security officers, particularly with respect to domestic violence and the security of women, which were delicate and complex matters; (c) the problem of retention of female security officers, despite extensive efforts to recruit them, largely due to difficulties experienced by female security officers with regard to the attitudes of some male colleagues; (d) the need for close collaboration with HR and Medical Directors in developing coordinated responses to situations involving mass casualties; and (e) the minimum qualifications for security officers, especially as regards prospective applicants who did not have the required educational background but who had significant work experience. The Network noted the full report of IASMN would be submitted to HLCM for its review and approval and that therefore HLCM would be requested to approve the revision of the “Inter-organizational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations security management system” and also to consider whether adjustments were required to the operation of the MORSS. It recalled the earlier work that had been done by the then CCAQ/PER to combat domestic violence and violence in the workplace and requested the CEB secretariat to liaise with the IASMN’s working group on the security of women with a view to developing a policy on these subjects. It also welcomed the development of new field security training programme which would be available on CD-ROM entitled “Survival in the Field” and agreed that security training, including refresher training, should be mandatory for all staff members.
(72) At the same meeting (ibid., para. 20) the HR Network reviewed the gaps in coverage under the Malicious Acts Insurance Policy (MAIP)and agreed that disparities in death and disability benefits among organizations should be avoided. It therefore decided that the review of the rules for the compensation of service-incurred death, injury or illness should take a wider approach and encompass related policies.
(73) At its 10th Session (October 2005: CEB/2005/5, paras. 23-29) HLCM reviewed a report of IASMN presented by the UN USG for Security and Safety who emphasized that every effort was being undertaken to ensure that the architecture of the security management system was not “New York–centric” but responded to the mandate of the General Assembly and the needs of the participating organizations. The report inter alia requested the endorsement of the Committee for the revised Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System. This was presented to respond to the request of the Assembly in resolution 59/276 for the Secretary-General to submit, at its sixtieth session, an accountability framework. IASMN also made recommendations concerning: (a) aviation safety, (b) progress in the implementation of prior IASMN recommendations, (c) minimum operating security standards, (d) coordination by DSS of lessons learned, (e) consultative approaches for the future review of policy issues, (f) internal audit of security matters, (g) a UN system policy regarding asylum seekers, (h) security training, (i) security information systems including the establishment of a working group for IT security management, (j) a strengthened programme assessment component in the current security threat and risk assessment model, (k) critical incident stress management, (l) security personnel including inter alia selection criteria and processes, (m) concerns regarding the security budget, (n) integration of UN Volunteers into country-specific security management arrangements, (o) arrest and detention provisions of the Field Security Handbook, (p) emergency telecommunications, (q) minimum operating residential security standards (MORSS), (r) managing situations involving mass casualties and (s) security for women. At the request of the HR Network, HLCM paid particular attention to aspects relating to the MORSS and their application to national staff.
(74) While recognizing the need for a robust and coherent accountability framework for security management across the UN system, representatives of the specialized agencies drew the Committee’s attention to Section III C, paragraphs 5, 7 and 8 of the document providing the revised accountability framework which failed to consider the governance structures of the various specialized agencies whereby their executive heads were accountable only to their respective governing bodies. In response, the UN USG for Safety and Security agreed to request the UN’s legal advisor to undertake urgent consultations with other organizations’ legal advisors with the view to achieving the dual objectives of (a) ensuring clarity and robustness of the accountability framework and (b) responding to the members’ concerns that there be no breach of their governance structures.
(75) HLCM expressed its appreciation for the work of the IASMN and for the collaboration and progress in reinforcing inter-agency collaboration in strengthening the unified field security management system and agreed to the revised “Framework for Accountability for the UN Security Management System” subject to an acceptable resolution of the reservations expressed with respect to Section III C mentioned in para. 74 above and a change in Section C (g) which defined the roles and responsibilities by replacing “exceptional” by “unnecessary”. The Committee also (a) reaffirmed that political or budgetary considerations should not be the overriding considerations of the UN system policy in determining means of transport used by UN system organizations; and (b) recognized that the issue of ensuring the security of national staff was far more complex, going beyond lack of provisions under MORSS, and therefore requested that the CEB secretariat, in collaboration with DSS, pursue consultations on the development of a methodology to better determine threats and means of response for enhancing the safety of national staff.
(76) At the eleventh session of HLCM (CEB/2006/3, paras.29-34), the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security briefed the Committee on the status of the implementation of the new security managements and his vision for ensuring the security and safety of staff in light of current and projected threats, as the safety and security of all staff was an increasingly complex challenge due to an increase in attacks on UN personnel and threats to their safety. The operational security chain was being strengthened by making more direct use of Designated Officials, who were best placed to leverage the primary role of host countries for the security of UN personnel. Partnerships with NGOs were also being strengthened. For the future, organizations had to provide for security arrangements and budgetary requirements at the earliest stage of programme planning to ensure that they were more closely calibrated to local needs. Other areas under consideration to strengthen the security management system included: The creation of a UN Safety Council for the purpose of promoting good practice; the consideration of a second generation of MOSS and MORSS; further development of insurances; Initiatives to better provide for the safety and security of locally-recruited staff such as in situation of poor sewage, lack of electricity and local fire services, etc; as well as the expansion of stress counseling capacities. The Committee: (a) Expressed its appreciation for the role played by the IASMN in support of DSS’s mandate. (b) Reaffirmed the importance of the unity of the security management system encompassing all organizations of the UN system, including meeting financial commitments, so as to ensure the system’s operational effectiveness; (c) Expressed the hope that the outstanding issue concerning the accountability framework would soon be resolved.
(77) At its twelfth session in New York (CEB/2006/HLCM/17, paras.48-49), the Network agreed on the principle of a lump summing approach for the Extended Monthly Evacuation Allowance (EMEA) and to look at the selection criteria for the countries, for which the allowance would apply as well as the amounts and calculation methods. The Network also decided to review the evacuation allowance.
(78) At its meeting in Rome in Sept-Oct 2006 (CEB/2006/5, paras.12-36) HLCM discussed the report on the IASMN meeting of May 2006 in Vienna (CRP.2), the report of the IASMN Working Group meeting of July 2006 in New York (CRP.3) and the Secretary-General report (A/61/223) on measures to improve cost-sharing arrangements for field security. The Committee (paras.12-36): a) Endorsed the recommendations included in IASMN report of May 2006, as follows: - Paragraphs 28 to 30 on the production of CD-ROM 2 (Advanced Security in the Field) - Paragraph 51: on the development, by October 2006, on a training package on how to scope with mass casualties to be included in the next workshop for DSS field security officers held after this date. - Paragraphs 55 to 58: on security for women. - Paragraphs 75-78: on the work done with regard to cooperation with NGOs. b) Welcomed the agreement reached at the IASMN meeting by all organizations, with the exception of the World Bank, on the wording of the final outstanding paragraph of the policy for the accountability of the UN security management system. c) With regard to the revised commercial passenger travel guidelines, as outlined in paragraph 34 of the IASMN report, noted that the issue of staff limits on flights required further study, especially in connection with the guidelines’ implications on insurance costs. d) Requested that UNDSS and the World Bank undertake further consultations in order to resolve the issue of World Bank’s participation in the UN security management system and the payment of its corresponding share. e) Established a technical working group to look at options for re-prioritisation of activities of UNDSS and corresponding funding mechanisms in order to best meet the objectives stated in the Strategic Framework 2008-2009 within the 2006-2007 cost-shared budget ceiling, and develop an effective surge capacity should resources become available (i.e. with no additional base resource growth in the 2008-2009 budget). The working group should complete its report and submit it to the HLCM by end of October 2006. The Terms of Reference of the group are attached as Annex 5 to the report CEB/2006/5.
(79) During an HLCM videoconference in November 2006 (CEB/2006/HLCM/R.19/Rev.1, paras.5-10), in response to the recommendation that a working group be established for the reprioritisation of activities of UNDSS, the Chair of the working group presented a report CEB/2006/HLCM/R.18, confirming that the already approved strategy for 2008-2009 would not be subject to further review, but that a budget revision would be submitted, including the withdrawal of the proposed additional funding for surge capacity. The Committee took note of CEB/2006/HLCM/R.18 and unanimously endorsed the recommendations of the Working Group in paragraph 5 (a-j) reported below for ease of reference: a) The re-deployment of existing FSCOs and accompanying support posts outlined in Annex C be implemented, keeping in mind that UNDSS may make adjustments based on the prevailing security situation in the countries affected; b) The methodology for re-prioritization of posts established by UNDSS and the Working Group continue to be applied in a flexible manner by UNDSS; c) UNDSS be encouraged to fill all vacant posts, especially FSCOs, as soon as possible, taking into full consideration the intention of achieving geographical representation and greater gender parity; d) UNDSS be encouraged to utilize unspent balances in this biennium allotted for purposes within the approved work plan for 2006-2007; e) UNDSS remove its request for the funds necessary for an additional 62 posts in 2008-2009, while recognizing the need and justification for these additional field posts, and amend its budget submittal accordingly to reflect zero growth vis-à-vis the 2006-2007 cost-shared portion of the budget, as directed by the HLCM; f) A first response surge capacity be created which relies on two pillars: 1) Use of existing UNDSS resources (Option 1) at specific duty stations designated as surge capacity locations, each contributing one FSCO to be re-deployed in the event of a crisis (Annex G). To the extent possible, the concurrence of respective Designated Officials will be obtained prior to deployment. 2) Rapid deployment with active and effective coordination of agency-specific FSOs (Option 4) in the early stages of a crisis, fully participating with UNDSS in the security coordination response cell. g) The HLCM assist and authorize UNDSS to seek and use funding from alternative sources, such as: Member States, Trust Fund, CERF, IGOs, Stand-by Partners, and private sector financial contributions for purposes that fall within the approved mandate of UNDSS; h) The existing mechanisms for appeals for funding at the onset of an emergency, whether consolidated or individual, make provision for an augmented surge capacity, as the particular security situation of the crisis requires, bearing in mind that security is a key component for enabling all UN activities while maintaining safety and security of staff as a high priority and has been prioritized as such by all members of the UN system; i) Such funding from alternative sources earmarked for security be made available to UNDSS to fund the creation of additional posts (Option 3) and draw upon the pre-agreed resources of Member States (Option 6) the duration of which would cover the number and duration of emergencies in progress; j) UNDSS initiate discussions at Government level with a view toward establishing MOUs for guaranteed commitments for use in times of crisis.
(80) At its seventh session (CEB/2007/HLCM/FB/10 23, paras. 137-140), the FB Network concluded that, aside from the other advantages related to participating in the master policy, participation to the UN/MAIP by additional UN entities could result in a considerable financial benefit to all participating entities, and had the potential of reducing the current competitive premium rate by as much as one-third.
In view of such considerations, invitations were being sent to the organizations that had withdrawn from the policy to rejoin the UN/MAIP. Other UN system entities who had similar policies or who were considering establishing this coverage were also urged to give positive consideration to joining the programme administered by the UN.
(81) At its fourteenth session (CEB/2007/HR/14, para.13), the HR Network agreed with the proposal by DSS that here should be an explicit policy to avoid sending interns to Phase III and above locations.
(82) At its 14th session (CEB/2007/6, paras. 68-71), HLCM endorsed the IASMN report (CEB/2007/HLCM/17) subject to the comments of the meeting.
The Committee appreciated the effort by UNDSS to increase accountability on its activities by providing detailed and timely information on status of expenditure, programme performance of its operations and vacancy status of its posts, and encouraged UNDSS to continue to do so, to enhance the overall transparency and stakeholders’ participation in the management of the UN Security Management System.
With a view to facilitating the resolution of issues that have or may emerge with respect to the management and funding of SMS, the Committee appointed a small Advisory Group of three member organizations, which would provide its support to UNDSS upon request by the HLCM. The group membership was determined as follows:
a) WFP, in representation of UN Funds and Programmes; b) UNIDO, in representation of small organizations; c) WHO, in representation of Specialized Agencies.
Andrew Lukach, Senior Security Manager of UNDP, would serve as Secretary of the Advisory Group.
(83) At its fifteenth session (CEB/2008/3, paras. 20-30), the conclusions, action points and recommendations for CEB by HLCM, as developed by the Committee based on a careful review of the IASMN report and on the discussion that followed, were detailed in Annex II of the above mentioned report. Such conclusions would be transmitted to the Secretary-General and to the Independent Panel on Staff Safety and Security as the HLCM’s response to the Secretary-General’s memo to Ms. Obaid and Mr. Veness of 22 February 2008 on “Operational Security Issues for consideration by CEB, HLCM and IASMN”.
The nature and scope of all such recommendations would be subject to review depending on the outcome of the Independent Panel on Staff Safety and Security led by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, including those in connection with staffing requirements. HLCM would hold an inter-sessional meeting soon after the Brahimi report was released to discuss its content and follow-up action. The implementation of HLCM’s recommendations would take into account the individual governance structures of HLCM member organizations. With respect to paragraph 38, CEB/2008/HLCM/5, concerning the variety of existing contracts between organizations of the United Nations system and a private emergency medical service provider, the Committee requested its Procurement Network, in consultation with the Chair of IASMN, to review the issue and recommend action.
Recognizing that chairmanship of IASMN requires considerable secretariat support, which only UNDSS was in a position to adequately ensure, the Committee recommended that, following internal consultations, IASMN nominate a member organization to act as a Co-Chair. The role of Co-Chair would be rotating among Network members.
(84) At its sixteenth session (CEB/2008/HLCM/HR/35, paras. 83-84), the HR Network: o Thanked the DSS representative for the useful briefing; o Expressed its concerns regarding the use of contractual modalities and the diverse contracts of staff serving the same purpose in the same duty station; o Highlighted the importance of ensuring that any personnel sent to the field is covered by insurance; o Proposed to strengthen measures to improve the situation of staff members in difficult duty stations, such as expanding the number of staff stress counsellors even to include assistance to family members; the extension of hazard pay; ensuring that staff members are not assigned consecutively to a hardship duty station without appropriate rest; providing more adequate training and information; o Agreed to establish a Working Group to review the recommendations of the report and to report back to HLCM.
(85) At its sixteenth session (CEB/2008/5, paras.27-32), HLCM: o Endorsed the Terms of Reference of the Steering Committee, as outlined in CEB/2008/HLCM/21/Rev.1, and the process agreed upon within such Committee to prepare the discussion and decision of CEB at its meeting of 24-25 October 2008. o Recommended that Executive Heads within respective organizations are kept up to date on the proceedings of the Steering Committee between now and the CEB meeting, so that they come well prepared to the meeting and ready to take the decisions that they will be asked to take, in order to bring to the implementation stage a series of recommendations that are essential to ensure the safety and security of UN system staff. o Commended IASMN for its professionalism in preparing and guiding the response of HLCM to the emerging needs on safety and security of staff, before the release of IPSS as well as in the implementation of the IPSS recommendations. o Requested IASMN to take action on the following issues and to report thereon to HLCM at its next session: A) Draft the Terms of Reference of the Network, including mandate, responsibilities, composition, governance and working modalities; B) Nominate a Vice-Chair; C) Propose a revised name for the Network.
o Recommended that Safety and Security of staff be mainstreamed at all levels of United Nations system activities, with the strategic aim of promoting security management as an integral and enabling part of policy, planning, operational and administrative consideration for United Nations programmes and activities. o Endorsed the proposal developed by DSS and ICAO with respect to Aviation Risk Management, and requested the Steering Committee led by Ms. Malcorra to recommend action on this item with immediate priority.
(86) At its seventeenth session (CEB/2009/3, paras.10-14), HLCM welcomed the report of the Steering Committee on Safety and Security and of its Operational Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations Security Management System (CEB/2009/HLCM/2), including its recommendations, and requested the HR and Finance & Budget Networks to urgently address the specific recommendations and issues relevant to them. In particular, the HLCM requested the HR Network to address the issues raised in the report concerning rules governing compensation in the event of service-related death, injury, or illness.
The Committee further requested:
• the HLCM Chair to produce a summary of the policy recommendations for endorsement by the CEB at its Spring 2009 session, underscoring those that cannot be fully operationalized without addressing the funding issues.
• the Chair to prepare a draft CEB statement to Member States expressing the CEB's strong commitment to implementing a comprehensive plan for a strengthened and enhanced system-wide security management system as well as the need to increase financial resources for it. • the Steering Committee to closely monitor the implementation of actions detailed in its report (as reflected in Annex B), including through detailing the budgetary implications stemming from its recommendations to be made available for the CEB at its Spring 2009 session.
The Committee endorsed the report’s approach to Security Risk Management and the proposed new concept to establish security phases and requested the Steering Committee to submit a detailed update on the progress of the pilot of the proposed Security Phase system, to be considered by HLCM during the Fall 2009 session.
Also, the Committee decided that the Executive Group on Security should be chaired by the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Safety and Security (UN/DSS) and requested the Steering Committee to provide an update on its functioning at HLCM’s Fall 2009 session.
(87) At the same session (CEB/2009/3, paras.15-20), the Committee urged that all actions related to and/or moves towards repositioning of elements within the Security Management System be done with an eye toward coherence with whole.
Noting the importance of treating MOSS as a risk management tool, the Committee endorsed the recommendations contained in the IASMN’s report that do not have financial implications, decided to establish an IASMN Co-Chair, with a two-year term, and requested to review for approval an updated version of the Network’s Terms of Reference.
The Committee also requested the Steering Committee for Safety and Security, working closely with UN/DSS, as Chair of IASMN, to come back to HLCM with a comprehensive report including all budgetary requests and proposals on corresponding financing mechanisms, in time to allow consideration and decision by HLCM, through the FB Network, before the deadline set for finalization of 2010-2011 budget submissions to the General Assembly. With respect to the proposals included in document CEB/2009/HLCM/17 from the UN Medical Directors Working Group, HLCM endorsed them and requested that its financial requirements be covered through savings from the cost-shared portion of the biennial budget of UN/DSS.
The Committee urged greater transparency on UN/DSS budget management and decisions, including on performance reviews and UN/DSS to consult with the Steering Committee during the planned UN/DSS Management Review, and requested that the Management Review be discussed in the next HLCM, with an eye toward the participation modalities of HLCM members in the UN Security Management System and the corresponding cost-sharing arrangements.
The Committee underscored the critical importance of moving ahead with decision making process on the above items, including the possibility of organizing an ad-hoc session of HLCM via video-conference at the most appropriate time before the 18th face-to-face session.
(88) At its seventeenth session (CEB/2009/HLCM/HR/27, paras. 34-38), the HR Network noted the comprehensive report by the Operational Working Group (OWG) and the additional document CEB/2009/HLCM/HR/24 which also raised a number of human resources issues. The Network thanked the participants in the OWG for their hard work and recognised the importance and complexities of Staff Safety and Security in today’s world. The Chair proposed to deal with the HR-related issues by setting up three working groups:
(a) One led by PAHO would develop a brochure that will inform staff of security related entitlements and benefits. The HR Network members of the OWG and the Standing Committee on Field Duty Stations are also addressing this matter with a focus to finalise a statement on employer responsibility. (b) One led by WFP would review the arrangements for service-incurred death with the aim to survey the provisions both inside and outside the UN, compare and develop a set of recommendations for the HR Network. Development of a Terms of Reference for a consultant to conduct the survey would be led by WFP, with support from UNHCR, UNDP and other field-based agencies. (c) The Field Group would address the issue of relocation of local staff after a crisis.
The deadline for the results of these three working groups is the end of May 2009. It was agreed that the Field Group would be the coordinating mechanism for the three working groups and that the group addressing the relocation of local staff would also deal with the issue of MORSS compliance for local staff. The Network was informed that the Field Group had developed a concept paper on SURGE Crisis response which will be shared.
Training programmes on safety and security for all staff and non-staff will be developed by the Field Group with UNDSS taking the lead. WFP will take the lead on a Working Group on Arrangements for Those Left Behind after the Death of a Staff Member. Upon review of the various activities currently underway in the area of service incurred death, it was concluded that the Terms of Reference of the consultant on the HR Network working group should be drafted so as not to overlap with those of the consultant addressing Appendix D, and that this work would be clearly linked to the HLCM.
(89) At the same session (CEB/2009/HLCM/HR/27, para. 39), the HR Network took note of the report of the IASMN Critical Incident Stress Management Working Group and the proposal to extend MORSS entitlements to national staff, which was referred by DSS; Agreed that the primary purpose of MORSS is to mitigate risks faced by internationally recruited staff, not for issues pertaining to security lapses or political issues in a country. Ultimately, the potential extension of MORSS will depend on its ability to effectively mitigate risk for national staff and the accompanying financial implications.
(90) At its eighteenth session (CEB/2009/HLCM/HR/46/Rev.1, paras.28-35), the HR Network was requested by HLCM to review and take action on some of the recommendations included in the “Report of the Steering Committee on Staff Safety and Security” (referred to as the Brahimi Report) (CEB/2009/HLCM/2/Rev.1).
The Network requested that a paragraph be included to clarify the difference between evacuation (outside of the country) and relocation (within the country) and to ensure consistent wording across all documents that are to be put forward to HLCM (review of service-incurred compensation, staff brochures and compensation for national staff). It suggested adding information on training for national staff and the new possibility of continuing hazard pay while working from home in exceptional circumstances. The Network also requested to include an action plan and cost some of the provisions listed in the report. In response to a recommendation from the Brahimi report, the Network reviewed a proposal for a “Rapid Response Administration Team” as part of an Immediate Crisis response to ensure that affected staff members and/or their families’ entitlements were facilitated, the functioning of the office was re-established and psycho-social and professional support was provided.
The Network thanked all those involved in preparing the various reviews and documents and recognized the hard work involved within a short time-frame and requested that the additional changes be completed before mid July in order to submit the revised proposals to HLCM by the deadline of 15 July 2009.
(91) At its eighteenth session (CEB/2009/6, paras.14-15), HLCM considered a status report from the Steering Committee on Staff Safety and Security, presented by its Chair, Ms. Susana Malcorra, USG/DFS. HLCM took note of progress and requested the Steering Committee to report back to HLCM on the completion of all tasks at its 19th session.
(92) At the same session (CEB/2009/6, para.16), the Committee endorsed the three communication brochures developed to inform staff about security related entitlements and benefits, and requested organizations to ensure that changes to the generic information were coordinated via the HR Network on an annual basis.
(93) At the same session (CEB/2009/6, paras.17-21), the Committee requested the HR Network to obtain feedback on its proposals regarding “Service-incurred compensation in the event of a malicious act” and “Improving security measures for National staff” from the relevant HLCM Networks, namely the Legal Network, IASMN, and the FB Network, and to complete work on the missing elements (cost implications), as well as on the refinement and further development of any substantive aspects of the proposals.
HLCM requested that the results of such work be put forward to the Steering Committee for Safety and Security as a prioritized set of recommendations for review and subsequent approval by HLCM at its Spring 2010 session, plus those set of recommendations that would require further consideration by HLCM; Also requested that such additional work be carried out with a view to providing the Committee with a comprehensive review of the safety and security procedures applicable to international staff, national staff, and non-staff personnel for comparable international organizations as well as for a selected number of Member States, and to identifying benchmarking and best practices for each of the measures, policies and support systems included in the original proposals.
HLCM asked those HLCM member organizations that led the development of the original proposals under the aegis of the HR Network to continue leading this additional work. Recognizing the considerable effort required to complete this task, requested other member organizations to assign dedicated and expert staff from financial, legal and security backgrounds to support the lead agencies in this work as well as requested that this further work be also carried out in full consultation with the HR/FB Network Working Group that was conducting a review of compensation plans for service-incurred death, illness or disability (Appendix D), with a view to developing and submitting a consolidated outcome to HLCM.
(94) At its eighteenth session (CEB/2009/6, paras.23-24), the Committee endorsed the revised Framework for Accountability as outlined in Annex B of the Report of the 4-6 August 2009 meeting of Inter-Agency Security Management Network (CEB/2009/HLCM/23); Recommended its approval by CEB at the Board’s 2009 fall session and its subsequent transmission to the General Assembly for approval. HLCM also approved the revised Terms of Reference for the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, as outlined in Annex C of the Report of the 4-6 August 2009 meeting of IASMN (CEB/2009/HLCM/23).
(95) During the HR Network’s videoconference in October (CEB/2009/HLCM/HR/48, para.2), it was agreed that PAHO will finalize, with UNDSS comments, the three communication brochures developed to inform staff about security related entitlements and benefits. The brochures will be circulated to organizations for a final validation, then for official distribution by the end of November 2009.
(96) At the HR Network’s nineteenth session (CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/18, paras.68-70), UNFPA and UNDP presented an update on the work already undertaken on Improving Security Measures for National Staff. The working group recommended three areas to address the gaps: 1) Benefits and entitlements; 2) Policy; 3) Support systems.
HLCM was expecting a comprehensive picture and proposal from the HR Network. This should cover all populations of staff: International Professional, National Professional, General Service, non-staff and identifying what support was needed for each category, the timeframe and costs. The HR Network agreed that further refinements were needed on the various proposals, and these needed to be integrated as well as requested some resources to undertake this comprehensive work, which would entail a dedicated person or team to complete the details.
(97) At its twelfth session (CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/9, paras.30-33), the FB Network took note of the conclusions reached in the Working Group meeting on Staff Safety and Security in November 2009; Encouraged the Working Group to complete its work on time before the submission of the next biennium 2011-2012 UNDSS budget, at latest by mid 2011 and; Accepted the revised apportionment of the 2010-2011 budget of the UNSMS as presented in document CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/8.
(98) At its nineteenth session (CEB/2010/3, paras.11-14), HLCM requested IASMN to review the requirement to notify all official travel to duty stations not in a security phase, concerning the Integrated Security Clearance and Tracking (ISECT).
(99) At the same session (CEB/2010/3, paras.15-17), the Committee adopted the new Security Level System that replaces the existing Security Phase System throughout the UN Security Management System, and approved the proposed schedule of implementation, on the understanding that there would be a concurrent process to address the administrative issues that need to be clarified; Requested DSS to produce a detailed implementation schedule, including training, and to establish a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess the functioning of the new system; Further requested the HR Network to establish a taskforce, to include representatives from DSS, to examine, as a priority, human resources issues related to the operationalisation of the new Security Level System, specifically with regard to issues of relocation, evacuation, hazard pay and other security-related entitlements as well as requested that all relevant UN Security Policy and Agency, Fund, Programme and Organisation documentation be amended by the official implementation date, to reflect the new SLS.
(100) At the same session (CEB/2010/3, paras.18-22), the Committee endorsed the continued use of the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk; Further endorsed the establishment of a Programme Working Group composed of members of the programme community, including the High Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the UN Development Group (UNDG), as well as security professionals, to address the following:
a. Define the four levels of programme criticality within the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk (Extreme, Critical, Essential and All Other); and b. Develop a framework for determining programme criticality for decision making by HLCM at its 2010 fall session.
The Committee also tasked the Chair of the Steering Committee on Safety and Security with convening the first meeting of the Programme Working Group to enable it to determine its working methods, appoint its leadership and set the required timeline to meet the fall 2010 deadline and urged the Executive Heads of all UN organizations to provide guidance to their representatives and appropriate staff for determining programme criticality within their organization, and to nominate security professionals to participate in working groups on programme criticality while the development of definitions and a common framework is undertaken.
(101) At the same session (CEB/2010/3, paras.23-24), the Committee took note of the development of the draft Estate Safety and Security policy and the ongoing work on the database of all UN facilities. HLCM requested that consideration be given to replacing ‘Estate’ by ‘Premises’, that a full report be provided to its 2010 Fall session and that the UNDG Task Team on Common Premises be consulted before the finalization of the report.
(102) At the same session (CEB/2010/3, paras.26-31), the Committee urged all organizations to ensure that staff members receive the Information Brochures on Security Related Entitlements and Benefits and requested that the three Working Groups of the HR Network, in ongoing consultation with the FB Network, and other Networks as appropriate, continue their work on staff safety and security and submit a comprehensive plan, with costing, to HLCM for consideration at its 2010 fall session. To assist the HR Network in expediting this work, a proposal would be developed by the CEB Secretariat for a Coordinator to work with the HR Network for six months, financed though the Fund for the Plan of Action on Harmonization of Business Practices.
(103) At its twentieth session (CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/35, paras.71-80), the HR Network agreed that all comments be sent to the Working Group for consideration by late August, with copy to the consultant. It welcomed the consultant and looked forward to receiving the results of her work in September. Dyane Dufresne-Klaus had been recruited as a consultant to work in consultation with the three working groups of the HR Network, in ongoing consultation with other Networks, in order to identify the current gaps in coverage on staff safety and security and develop a consolidated report, which would be presented to HLCM at its Fall session in September 2010.
(104) At its thirteenth session (CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/30, paras.24-39), the FB Network expressed strong support for the work of the WG on Safety and Security Costs and underscored that current environment was supportive of introducing greater transparency, accountability and management reforms.
The mandate of the WG on Safety and Security Costs was to review the current cost-sharing formula for the UNSMS with a view to ensuring that it was fair, transparent and based on objective parameters. Two additional guiding principles for the work were later defined as “those benefiting from security services should pay for those services” and “security cost charges should have sufficient transparency to ensure effective resourcing”.
The main themes of issues were summarised in the discussion paper as : • a lack of overview on total security costs; • cost attribution modality not seen as distributing costs equitably; • and existing funding modalities do not suit the current volatile security cost needs.
Four main change areas were identified in the discussion paper as: • Cost and beneficiaries of JFA; • Local cost-share (LCS) budgeting with respect to transparency, predictability and consistency; • The budget process; • and Funding mechanisms.
The FB Network agreed to drop the option of requesting the regular budget to fund the shared security services and looked forward to recommendations from the Working Group after full discussion of all the issues raised.
(105) At its twentieth session (CEB/2010/5, paras.25-32), HLCM took note of the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General and expressed its deep appreciation for his dedication and efforts towards supporting acceptable approaches to continue delivering on the mandates of UN organizations, along the CEB-stated principle of “how to stay”, and based on a fundamental analysis of programme criticality.
(106) At the same session (CEB/2010/5, paras.33-39), the Commitee took note of the progress report on the operationalization of the SLS and of the issues identified by the HR Network Task Force and looked forward to receiving the final recommendations of the Task Force, to be reviewed and endorsed by the HR Network, by the end of October 2010; Further took note of the briefing by the Under-Secretary General, UNDSS and endorsed the documents entitled “Security Management Decision Making and the Security Level System (SLS)” and “Relocation and Evacuation Decision after the Introduction of the Security Level System” (CEB/2010/HLCM/18 and Add.1).
(107) At the same session (CEB/2010/5, paras.40-49), the Committee further thanked the Chair of the Programme Criticality Working Group for offering her kind availability to lead this critical work, and all organizations/departments that are contributing with extreme dedication to it and took note with appreciation of the considerable progress made by the Working Group, and looked forward to considering its conclusions at its spring 2011 session, before submission for approval by CEB.
(108) At its last meeting on 17 September the PC WG discussed the findings of the Sub/Technical Programme Criticality (PC) Working Group (WG) and agreed on the following:
• Acceptable risk was based on residual risk.
• The concept of programme criticality was one component of the Acceptable Risk model. To this end, the “Programme Criticality framework” had to be developed to fit logically into the Acceptable Risk model.
• Understanding that the terms "Extreme", "Critical", "Essential" and "All" had been used to describe “programme criticality” levels, and that the current definitions were vague and could not match common language used within the UN and Donor community, there was a need for clarification of the terms and type of activities that could take place (which would be situation dependent as requirements vary from one area to another).
• The concept of a “level” system based on the Acceptable Risk model was the most appropriate and it was recommended that the current terminology be replaced with a level system (level “Unacceptable” plus levels 1 to 4. Criteria for the determination of the levels were still being finalized).
• The establishment of an “Executive” body (i.e. an “Executive Group on Programmes”) was recommended to assist rapid decision making along the same lines as the Executive Group on Security.
• The draft concept had to be “tested” as part of the process. Although the list had yet to be formalised, countries that had been identified for pilot-testing could include:
o Somalia o Yemen (its inclusion was pending due to a number of high level delegations travelling to the region in November/December 2010). o Pakistan (to be included no earlier that January 2011)
• The “Pilot” testing would include those organizations/secretariat departments with operations in the above-named countries, i.e. WFP, UNHCR, OCHA, DPKO/DPA, WHO, UNDP and UNICEF.
The expected end result was to be a “Programme Criticality Framework”, user friendly and logically integrated into the Acceptable Risk model. The framework had to result in a process that ensured the programmes and personnel that remained in country are working on the highest priority functions and programmes in accordance with the strategic objectives of the United Nations system.
(109) At the same session (CEB/2010/5, paras.50-57), the Committee also took note with appreciation of the ongoing development by UNDSS of a “UN Use of Force Policy”, which had already been vetted by the UN Office of Legal Affairs and was currently under review by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); Noted that policies and standardized training programmes on “close protection” were being developed; Took note of the update provided on the United Nations Premises Safety and Security Policy and looked forward to a full report on this issue at its next regular session, with due consideration to the issue of building standards for the construction of UN buildings.
The Committee also recognized that the establishment of the security staff screening and vetting policy was a major issue impacting on a cross section of disciplines, e.g. human resources, legal, political and as such, welcomed the proposal by the IASMN that all relevant UN system parties be engaged in formulating such policy. To this end, HLCM proposed the establishment of a working group under its auspices to move this issue forward. Consultations among organizations to form this Group would be led by the CEB Secretariat.
The Committee looked forward to a speedy conclusion of the work of the FB Network Working Group on Safety and Security Costs, taking into consideration the objectives of transparency in the budgeting process and in the usage of the resources subject to cost sharing, the alignment of such budgeting process with those of member organizations, the sharing of information among organizations on their expenditure on safety and security, the agreement on a fair methodology to apportion the jointly financed costs, and a recognition of the political difficulty inherent in attempting to cover such jointly financed security costs through the Regular Budget of the United Nations.
The Committee took note of the establishment by IASMN of a working group to examine the issue of Private Security Companies and Private Military Security Companies, and of the obligation of UNDSS to provide the lead input into the UN Secretariat’s Policy Committee on this matter and; Endorsed the IASMN recommendation that the Integrated Security Clearance and Tracking system (ISECT) be renamed “TRIP”. It further endorsed the objective of requiring that all official travel be registered in TRIP, on the basis of full integration between TRIP and each organization’s travel system, by the end of 2011.
(110) At the same session (CEB/2010/5, paras.58-68), the Committee re-affirmed its strong commitment to the safety and security of all personnel working under the flag of the United Nations; Acknowledged that, in the past three years, HLCM and CEB had considered and adopted a number of new mechanisms, procedures and tools which, all together, represented a major step forward towards the re-design and strengthening of a UN Security Management System that responds to the changed, increased challenges of UN system operations; Recognized with great appreciation the fundamental role in this work of the HLCM Steering Committee on Safety and Security, of its Chair, USG Susana Malcorra, and of all the stakeholders engaged in such process, particularly UN/DSS and; Decided that the HLCM Steering Committee on Safety and Security would cease to continue. In the future, the Steering Committee could be reconvened on a strictly ad-hoc basis, if circumstances required.
(111) At its videoconference of 18 November 2010 (CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/41, paras.2-4), the HR Network, regarding the implementation of the new Security Level System (SLS) as of 1 January 2011, was requested to endorse three areas: a) the Administrative Measures; b) the updating of the Brochures; c) that Hazard Pay/Danger Pay be referred to the ICSC WG on the Review of the Mobility and Hardship scheme. It was agreed that the task group would prepare a comparison chart showing the present situation and the new proposals. Organizations should send further comments to the task group.
(112) At its 21th session in Paris, UNESCO (CEB/2011/3, paras. 23-26), HLCM took note of the briefing provided by the Chair of the Programme Criticality Working Group and looked forward to considering its final outcome, as also informed by the results of the field testing, at its fall 2011 session, for subsequent submission to CEB.
(113) At its 21th session in Paris, UNESCO (CEB/2011/3, paras. 27-33), HLCM acknowledged the role of the UN Security Management System (UNSMS) to enable the continuation of UN programmes against the background of major and challenging events, demonstrating that the UNSMS was no longer risk adverse. HLCM also noted that the UNSMS functioned as a confederation, comprised of UN/DSS, members of the IASMN, as well as individual agencies’ security officers: a combined network that added value to the UN System itself.
(114) At its 21th session in Paris, UNESCO (CEB/2011/3, paras. 34-35), HLCM: a) Endorsed the newly approved Chapter III of Security Policy Manual: UNSMS Applicability Policy, as reflected in CEB/2011/HLCM/2/Rev.1, and which replaces Chapter III of the old Field Security Handbook. b) Endorsed the IASMN recommendation that all UN system Close Protection Officers be fully certified to the UNDSS specified standard within four years. c) Endorsed the policy on Security Clearance Procedures and the Travel Request Information Process (TRIP) to go into full effect on 1 January 2012 by which time it is expected there will be full integration between each organization’s travel system and TRIP. d) Endorsed the Use of Force Policy for UN security officials in the Security Management System, as approved by IASMN. e) Took note of the documents entitled “Relocation, Evacuation, Alternate Work Modalities – Measures To Avoid Risk” and “Security Level System” for inclusion in the UNSMS Security Policy Manual, as contained in CEB/2011/HLCM/2/Rev.1, as well as of the update provided on other issues taken up by the IASMN at its 14th session, i.e. Premises Vulnerability Questionnaire and UN Premises Policy; Draft Model Host Country Security Agreements and Private Security Companies. The Committee recommended completion of any necessary follow up work for consideration by HLCM at its next session.
The Committee took note of the work undertaken by the HR Network and endorsed document CEB/2011/HLCM/3 on the “Measures to replace the present Annex I of the Field Security Handbook”. Other provisions included in the revised Annex I referred to GA resolution 65/248 on the phasing out of the Extended Monthly Security Allowance, which would eventually be replaced by the non-family hardship element.
(115) At its twenty third session in September 2011 (CEB/2011/HLCM/HR/23, paras. 29-33), the HR Network recalled that the Inter-Agency Rapid Response Team (the establishment of which had been endorsed by HLCM and the CEB in 2010) had no leader at present. The Network agreed that leadership would focus mainly on the coordination role required, and in this context could be rotated, without loss of institutional knowledge.
(116) At its seventeenth session in Turin (CEB/2011/HLCM/FB/21, paras.30-36), the FB Network took note of the updated work plan of the Working Group on Safety and Security Costs to complete the review of the cost-sharing formula for the apportionment of the budget of the UNSMS and requested an update on work progress in its next meetings.
At its twenty second session (CEB/2011/5, paras.30-47), HLCM: o Took note with appreciation of the briefing by the USG/DSS. o Took note with appreciation of the note prepared by the HR Network Standing Committee on Field Duty Stations on outstanding issues related to staff and families affected by the heinous bombing of the UN Premises in Abuja, and commended the HR Network for having reached agreement on coordinated HR actions to ensure a system-wide harmonized response. o Approved the Road Safety Policy as outlined in CEB/2011/HLCM/17. o Noted that while the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) must manage the security management aspects of the effects of and response to natural disasters for UN personnel and premises, managing the risks from natural disasters affecting the UN is a collective responsibility, cutting across many disciplines in the UN system and, as such, requires broader consideration, outside of the UNSMS.
(117) At the same session (CEB/2011/5, paras.48-58), the Committee: o Approved the Programme Criticality Framework (methodology and tool) for decision making within the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk, as outlined in document CEB/2011/HLCM/18, and submitted it to CEB for endorsement at its upcoming fall session on 28 October 2011. o Recommended that the Programme Criticality Framework be rolled out in at least 12 high priority countries (between January 2012 and April 2013) and that a consolidated progress report (with lessons learned and recommended adjustments) be made to HLCM at its 2013 spring session, following a preliminary update at the fall 2012 session. The list of 12 countries could be adjusted if so required by changing security conditions. o Affirmed that the above rollout is a collective UN-wide responsibility and will be undertaken by a “Programme Criticality Coordination Team” comprising members of DFS, DOCO, FAO, ILO, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNDP, DPA, DPKO, DSS, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP, WHO, UNEP and UNODC (under UNICEF’s leadership) and supported by new funding arrangements for global coordination and management, travel and related expenses for in-country training and the development of a Programme Criticality e-training package. o Tasked the above “Programme Criticality Coordination Team” to develop a detailed Funding Proposal with Implementation Plan and Budget for the rollout of the Programme Criticality training, along the principles, activities and requirements outlined in document CEB/2011/HLCM/18/Add.1. The finalization of this Funding Proposal remains essential in order to cover the costs of the rollout and to ensure that all related activities are implemented on schedule. The Committee further noted that, should sufficient funding not be made available on time, it would delay the start date, as well as scheduled training activities and expected results.